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INTRODUCTION
People form business relationships for a variety of reasons. The law, in
turn, provides a variety of entity forms through which parties can do business. In
many of these forms, the law assumes that one or more of the parties are entrusting

2012]

THE NAKED FIDUCIARY

881

property or the operation of the business to others, with little ability to monitor or
influence those in control.1 That assumption not only is flawed in many instances
but also may undermine the intrinsic value of the parties’ original business
relationship. Accordingly, using the “fiduciary” label in business law requires a
thoughtful and nuanced approach.
A fiduciary generally is “someone who has undertaken to act for or on
behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a
relationship of trust and confidence.”2 Although the scope of any fiduciary
relationship often is context specific, fiduciaries typically owe separate duties of
care and loyalty to their entrustors. The duty of care requires the fiduciary to
pursue the interests of the entrustor in a non-negligent manner, whereas the duty of
loyalty demands that the conduct of the fiduciary be free from conflict and selfdealing.3 A fiduciary also owes other duties to its entrustors, such as duties of good
faith, disclosure (candor), and accounting; each of which may flow from the duties
of care and loyalty or may be viewed independently.4
Commentators have considered the scope of fiduciary duties in the
business context and debated their utility in light of protections afforded business
managers, including the business judgment rule and exculpation provisions that
shield certain parties from personal liability for breaches of the duty of care. 5
Legislators likewise have grappled with waivers or modifications of traditional
fiduciary duties in unincorporated business entities.6 For example, many state
statutes governing LLCs permit the duties of care and loyalty to be modified to
varying degrees, with some statutes prohibiting modifications that are “manifestly
unreasonable” and others allowing the duties to be largely eliminated. 7
1.
2.
3.

See TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 7–13 (2011).
ALASTAIR HUDSON, EQUITY AND TRUSTS 52 (6th ed. 2010).
See FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 101–07 (discussing fiduciaries’ general

duties).
4.
Id.
5.
See generally Kelli A. Alces, Debunking the Corporate Fiduciary Myth, 35
J. CORP. L. 239 (2009) (examining corporate fiduciary duties); Victor Brudney, Contract
and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. REV. 595 (1997) (examining a debate
concerning the role and nature of corporate fiduciary duties); Larry E. Ribstein, The
Uncorporation and Corporate Indeterminacy, 2009 U. ILL. L. REV. 131, 146–61 (explaining
and contrasting the general contract approach to governance in the alternative entity context
to that under corporate law); Celia R. Taylor, The Inadequacy of Fiduciary Duty Doctrine:
Why Corporate Managers Have Little to Fear and What Might Be Done About It, 85 OR. L.
REV. 993 (2006) (examining the role of fiduciary duties in the corporate context); see also
infra Part I.B.2.
6.
See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, An Analysis of the Revised Uniform Limited
Liability Company Act, 3 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 35, 62–77 (2008) (explaining the development
of and critiquing fiduciary duty provisions of the uniform act); see also infra Part I.A.2.
7.
See generally Mark J. Loewenstein, Fiduciary Duties and Unincorporated
Business Entities: In Defense of the “Manifestly Unreasonable” Standard, 41 TULSA L.
REV. 411 (2006) (discussing issues raised by fiduciary duty law in the alternative entity
context); Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary Duties Should Apply to the LLC Manager After
More Than a Decade of Experimentation?, 32 J. CORP. L. 565 (2007) (exploring the
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This Article presents an in-depth empirical study (“OA Study”) of
fiduciary duty and governance provisions in LLC operating agreements
(“Operating Agreements”).8 The OA Study evaluates, among other things, whether
Operating Agreements: (i) modify members’ or managers’ fiduciary duties;
(ii) limit or eliminate the personal liability of members, managers, or others;
(iii) permit members or managers to consider the interests of themselves or others
in lieu of the LLC or its members generally; (iv) provide governance rights to
parties who are not members or managers of the LLC; (v) indemnify or offer buyout rights to parties; and (vi) require the consent of certain parties to amend or
otherwise affect the rights of members and managers under the Operating
Agreement. The data also include information about the LLCs’ states of
organization, membership composition, and the industries to which the LLCs
belong.9 Although there are limitations to the OA Study, the data offer insight not
otherwise available regarding how and when parties are contracting around
fiduciary duties. The data also support inferences regarding the policy implications
of those practices.
The data and analyses presented in Part II show that Operating
Agreements frequently modify the duties and personal liability of both member
and non-member managers.10 Likewise, they are more likely to modify members’
duty of loyalty and allow members to compete with the LLC than they are to
modify members’ duty of care.11 Although these data may not be surprising, the
data also suggest that some Operating Agreements go further and expressly permit
members and managers to consider their own interests or the interests of certain
other parties in lieu of the best interests of the LLC or its members generally. That
type of duty variation is more typically found in Operating Agreements providing
outside parties with governance rights (for example, voting or consent rights).12
Moreover, the data suggest that parties at the bargaining table can impact
governance provisions and protect their own rights and interests. For example,
agreements modifying members’ duty of loyalty are significantly more likely to
require members’ unanimous consent to subsequently amend the Operating
Agreement.13 Similarly, agreements eliminating members’ personal liability
through an exculpation provision are significantly more likely to also indemnify
members or members and their affiliates from liability relating to the LLC.14 These
associations support an argument that members can obtain governance provisions

development of, and critiquing the trend in, state statutes permitting broad modifications to
fiduciary duties); see also infra Part I.A.2.
8.
See generally infra Part II.
9.
See infra Part II.B.1.
10.
See infra Part II.B.2.
11.
See infra Part II.B.2.b.
12.
See, e.g., Thomas E. Plank, The Security of Securitization and the Future of
Security, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1655 (2004) (discussing third-party control in special
purpose entity securitizations); see also infra Part II.B.3.
13.
See infra Part II.B.2.c.
14.
See infra Part II.B.2.c.
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in their favor and have the ability to preserve those ex ante bargains over the life of
the business relationship.
The data underscoring the importance of being at the bargaining table,
however, also raise concerns regarding imbalances in bargaining power. For
example, provisions modifying managers’ duties and liability are significantly
associated with (i) provisions indemnifying managers and their affiliates, and
(ii) the absence of any buy-out rights for members.15 Although the potential
member exposure associated with these provisions could be priced into the
bargain, their inclusion also could be the result of parties’ lack of information or
representation in the negotiations. These factors are critical in evaluating the utility
and desirability of lessening or even eliminating fiduciary duties in the LLC
context.
Overall, the OA Study demonstrates that—regardless of any potential
risk—parties are invoking state statutes that permit modifications to the traditional
fiduciary duties owed by, and the personal liability of, members and managers in
LLCs. The pervasive use of these provisions and the data associations highlighted
by the OA Study inform the ongoing debate among policymakers, courts, and
commentators regarding the fiduciary nature of LLC business relationships.
The fiduciary debate in the LLC context primarily concerns whether
parties can negotiate the terms of their business relationship or remain subject to
some level of fiduciary duty under statutory or common law. Business parties
appear to approach the LLC form more as a contractual relationship, rather than a
fiduciary relationship, and some commentators endorse that approach. 16 Others
believe that a threshold level of mandatory fiduciary duty is needed even in the
LLC context.17 Courts appear willing to respect the parties’ contractual
arrangement, but some are just as willing to impose traditional fiduciary duties. 18
Legislatures also are willing to recognize flexibility in the level of LLC fiduciary
duties, but only two states permit a complete elimination of those duties. 19
15.
See infra Part II.B.4.
16.
See Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability Unlimited, 24 DEL. J. CORP. L. 407,
446 (1999) (arguing for the freedom of contract in unincorporated entities and suggesting
that lawyers may echo this preference); see also infra Part I.B.2.
17.
See, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, Minority Oppression & the Limited Liability
Company: Learning (or Not) from Close Corporation History, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
883, 918–76 (2005) (recognizing unequal bargaining power between majority and minority
owners in LLCs and arguing for application of the minority oppression doctrine); see also
infra Part I.B.2.
18.
See, e.g., In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 62–65, 72 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2009) (denying motion to dismiss a LLC bankruptcy case and finding that the
LLC’s operating agreement incorporated general corporate law principles and provided the
independent director ability to act in accordance with corporate law duties); Kahn v.
Portnoy, Civil Action No. 3515-CC, 2008 WL 5197164, at *13 (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 2008)
(denying motion to dismiss breach of fiduciary duty claims and finding that operating
agreement was ambiguous on scope of duties); see also infra Part I.B.1.
19.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-108 (2012); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.286
(2012).
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The divergent views about the fiduciary nature of LLCs create uncertainty
and additional cost for parties electing to do business in the LLC form. 20 Parties
bargaining ex ante for limited or no duties may ex post face court-imposed
fiduciary duties and liability. That result often changes the economics and
dynamics of the parties’ original bargain. Simply imposing some level of
mandatory fiduciary duties in all LLCs, however, does not provide a satisfactory
answer from either a business or compliance perspective. 21 Achieving maximum
utility in the governance of LLCs requires a delicate balance that appreciates the
different parties who may elect to do business as an LLC and the relationships
among these parties.
An increasing number of scholars in a variety of disciplines are
reassessing legal regulations under behavioral and cognitive theories, including the
different types of trust relationships that exist in economic and other
relationships.22 Trust theory is particularly relevant to LLCs because personal
relationships often play a key role in those business entities. For example, parties
forming LLCs frequently have preexisting relationships and may have motivations
outside of any legal regulation to pursue the parties’ collective interest. The trust
underlying those relationships may differ significantly from parties using the LLC
form as, for example, an impersonal investment vehicle. The latter situation likely
is based primarily on cognitive or calculated trust, and the absence of any
relational or affective trust may warrant some legal regulation to discourage selfdealing and other inappropriate conduct by managers.23
Notably, the need for regulation in one situation does not justify or
support the imposition of the same regulation in the other, more relational context.
In fact, some commentators and studies posit that using such a one-size-fits-all
approach could be counterproductive in situations involving blended or informed
trust where parties have the relationship, information, and capacity to assess the
trustworthiness of the counterparty. 24 External regulation—as opposed to the
internal motivation and personal risk assessment present in an informed trust
setting—may set a lower threshold of acceptable conduct. It also may cause parties

20.
See generally Alex Y. Seita, Uncertainty and Contract Law, 46 U. PITT. L.
REV. 75 (1984) (discussing the impact of uncertainty on contract parties’ expectations,
bargains, and rights).
21.
See infra Part III.C.
22.
See, e.g., Claire A. Hill & Erin Ann O’Hara, A Cognitive Theory of Trust, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1717, 1718 (2006) (“A fast-growing legal literature can draw insights
from trust scholars in several other fields, including sociology, psychology, political
science, economics, neuroscience, medicine, and management to explore the effects of legal
policy on the nature of trust in interpersonal relationships.”); see also LYNN A. STOUT,
CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE (2011).
23.
Frank B. Cross, Law and Trust, 93 GEO. L.J. 1457, 1463–71 (2005)
(explaining concepts of affective and cognitive trust and observing that “[a]ffective trust is
akin to an emotion, while cognitive trust is more of a reasoned decision to trust another”).
24.
See, e.g., Ronald J. Colombo, Trust and the Reform of Securities Regulation,
35 DEL. J. CORP. L. 829, 849–52 (2010); Hill & O’Hara, supra note 22, at 1729–33.
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to forego meaningful assessment and monitoring activities. 25 Consequently,
mandating fiduciary duties in all scenarios may weaken the intrinsic value of LLC
relationships built on informed trust. 26
Data presented in this Article, in addition to prior literature about LLCs
and literature about trust, suggest a workable and balanced approach to LLC
governance: so-called “coactive” LLCs.27 This approach builds on existing default
rules for LLCs, but also imposes traditional fiduciary duties on managing members
and managers in all LLCs other than those qualifying as coactive LLCs. Coactive
LLCs, in turn, involve three essential elements: (i) parties with all reasonably
necessary information; (ii) parties who actively engage in negotiating the
Operating Agreement (or have an opportunity to negotiate at the time of signing);
and (iii) parties who have some control or meaningful influence over the future
direction of the LLC. Each of these criteria is described more fully in Part III.A.
The coactive LLC approach optimizes informed trust and respects bargained-for
governance structures while protecting parties who have signed, but not really
contracted for, the terms of the Operating Agreement.
Part I of this Article describes the origins of the LLC form and the
characteristics that distinguish it from corporations and other unincorporated
entities. This Part first considers the purpose and development of the LLC form. It
then discusses legislative and judicial responses to LLC governance disputes and
commentators’ perspectives on the appropriate approach to fiduciary duties in the
LLC context.
Part II presents the data and key findings of the OA Study. This Part
summarizes the methodology and scope of the study, as well as some basic
descriptive data emerging from the study. It also explains the results of regression
analyses and draws several inferences from the data. The characteristics and
associations detailed in this Part lay the foundation for the policy analysis in Part
III.
Part III considers the data through the lenses of trust theory, cultural
norms, and general business policy. It examines the meaning of trust and the
application of trust theory to the economic and business relationships typically
present in the LLC context. It builds on trust literature to evaluate potential
regulatory approaches to LLC governance. The discussion highlights the value of a
policy that allows parties in coactive LLCs to freely tailor their governance
25.
See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 24, at 850 (“[E]vidence suggests that law and
regulation can ‘crowd out’ trust—a phenomenon whereby legal mechanisms and adherence
to regulatory standards supplant social norms and the binds of trust.”).
26.
See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1741 (2001) (noting
flaw in “assum[ing] that it is the threat of the law that reins in misbehavior in all
situations”).
27.
See infra Part III.C.1 (“Coactive LLCs are identified by three key elements:
(i) fully informed parties, (ii) active negotiation by the parties at the time the particular
member signs the Operating Agreement, and (iii) some control or meaningful role in
material transactions pursued by the LLC.”).
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structures, but that also retains traditional standards of conduct in other LLC
forms. The Article concludes by encouraging policymakers to adopt the coactive
LLC approach and refrain from clothing parties with fiduciary duties where the
fiduciary label is contrary to the parties’ ex ante bargain, as well as the overall
basis of their business relationship.

I. THE ORIGINS OF LLCS AND RELATED GOVERNANCE ISSUES
The LLC form is a relatively recent development.28 It generally combines
the limited liability protections of corporations with the tax treatment and
flexibility of partnerships. LLC statutes are largely modeled after the default rules
of partnership law, but LLC statutes in many states, and the parties invoking them,
seek to push the concept of “doing business by contract” even further.29 Some
commentators view these efforts as positive innovations in governance and
business law efficiency, whereas others are troubled by a perceived erosion of
fiduciary duties.30 This Part briefly outlines the key aspects of the LLC form,
focusing on the contractual nature of the form and how fiduciary duty law governs
this contractual relationship.
A. The Basic Parameters of the LLC Form
Parties historically used the corporate form to, among other things, obtain
limited liability for owners and investors, facilitate centralized management, and
expand financing options. Many incorporators perceive these advantages as
outweighing the potential downsides associated with more formal regulation of
corporations and the corporate tax structure. The proliferation of unincorporated
business entity forms that offer limited liability, flexible management structures,

28.
The Wyoming legislature passed the first LLC statute in 1975. See, e.g.,
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 119–20 (2010) (summarizing origins
of LLC). See generally William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and
Antecedents, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 855, 855–60 (1995) (explaining the genesis of the
Wyoming statute); Daniel S. Kleinberger, Two Decades of “Alternative Entities”: From
Tax Rationalization Through Alphabet Soup to Contract as Deity, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. &
FIN. L. 445 (2009) (explaining the development of LLCs).
29.
See, e.g., Ann E. Conaway, Lessons to be Learned: How the Policy of
Freedom to Contract in Delaware’s Alternative Entity Law Might Inform Delaware’s
General Corporation Law, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789, 790–92 (2008) (discussing freedom of
contract principle underlying Delaware’s LLC statute); Miller, supra note 7, at 586–90
(discussing the progression of fiduciary duty waivers in the LLC context); see also J.
William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, Contractarianism and Its Discontents: Reflections on
Unincorporated Business Organization Law Reform, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 493, 501–05
(2009) (examining the development of the freedom of contract principle in partnership and
LLC statutes).
30.
Compare Ribstein, supra note 16, at 435, 446 (arguing for complete freedom
of contract approach), with SANDRA K. MILLER, LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES: A COMMON
CORE MODEL OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES §1:4 (2012), available at Westlaw LLCFID (arguing for
some level of mandatory rules in LLC context).
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and the option to be taxed as a partnership, however, challenge the common kneejerk reaction that a corporation is the most favorable entity choice.31
1. Forming LLCs
The LLC has emerged as the preferred unincorporated alternative to the
corporate form.32 Many state LLC statutes are based on freedom of contract
principles and, consequently, allow parties wide latitude in negotiating many
aspects of their business relationship.33 For example, parties typically can elect to
be member-managed or, alternatively, use a centralized form of management more
akin to a corporation. Moreover, the active participation of members in the
management of the LLC generally does not affect their limited liability rights.
Parties also can define member qualifications, establish different classes of
membership, and allocate voting and economic rights among members in a manner
that best reflects the bargained-for terms of the relationship. 34
Although the LLC form does not necessarily foster the various financing
options and free-transferability-of-ownership interests associated with
corporations, parties can use the LLC form to implement staged financing and
attract outside, passive investors with rights similar to those of corporate
stockholders.35 The challenge here lies in the absence of robust markets for most
LLC interests and the limited exit strategies available to investors. These potential

31.
See Rodney D. Chrisman, LLCs Are the New King of the Hill: An Empirical
Study of the Number of New LLCs, Corporations, and LPs Formed in the United States
Between 2004–2007 and How LLCs Were Taxed for Tax Years 2002–2006, 15 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 459, 459–60, 468–78, 483–85 (2010) (presenting empirical data to support
statement that “[t]he limited liability company (LLC) is now undeniably the most popular
form of new business entity in the United States”).
32.
See id. at 460 (“[I]n Delaware and Colorado in 2007, over three new LLCs
were formed for every one new corporation formed. Only four states had more new
corporations formed than new LLCs in 2007; ten states and the District of Columbia had
ratios of new LLCs to new corporations formed in excess of four to one; Connecticut came
in with the highest, at a ratio of new LLCs to new corporations formed of 11.826 to 1.”).
33.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (2012) (“It is the policy of this chapter
to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability
of limited liability company agreements.”); see also Conaway, supra note 29, at 801
(discussing the freedom of contract principle).
34.
For general explanations about the flexibility available to parties under
various states’ LLC statutes, see Barbara Ann Banoff, Company Governance Under
Florida’s Limited Liability Company Act, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 53, 57–66 (2002)
(discussing Florida law); Conaway, supra note 29, at 790–96 (discussing Delaware law);
Elizabeth S. Miller, Fiduciary Duties, Exculpation, and Indemnification in Texas Business
Organizations, in ESSENTIALS OF BUSINESS LAW 1, 7–9 (State Bar of Tex. ed., 2010),
available at http://www.texasbarcle.com/Materials/Events/9254/120692_01.pdf (discussing
Texas law).
35.
See generally RIBSTEIN, supra note 28, at 193–222 (discussing utility of key
features of LLC in large company context).
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issues are among the reasons some investors continue to prefer the corporate
form.36
Consequently, whether parties elect to do business in the LLC form
frequently depends on the identity of the parties and their business objectives.37
For example, private equity funds may opt to form an LLC for tax or strategic
management reasons, such as greater ease in aligning member distributions with
firm profitability.38 Parties also use LLCs to facilitate asset securitizations that
protect intellectual property or financial investments from risks associated with the
originating company.39 Likewise, tax considerations or general flexibility in
designing the internal governance of the firm may attract joint venturers,
entrepreneurs, or others with pre-existing relationships to the LLC form. 40
Parties who have a specific reason for electing the LLC form likely will
take the time and incur the cost of negotiating an Operating Agreement that
maximizes the utility of the freedom of contract principle. 41 Others may choose the
LLC form, however, because it is recommended by counsel or friends and not
necessarily for a particular business or strategic purpose. In those cases, less
thought or care may be given to the terms of the business relationship, and the
LLC statute’s default rules may govern.42 Given the broad potential uses of the
LLC form, any discussion of governance provisions must consider both the default
rules and desirable modifications to those rules.
2. LLC Statutes and Fiduciary Duties
Parties motivated to negotiate an LLC Operating Agreement often
address the fiduciary nature, if any, of the parties’ business relationship. Parties
may focus on fiduciary duties for a variety of legitimate reasons. 43 For example,
one or more of the parties may hold or plan to obtain interests in other potentially

36.
See generally Susan Pace Hamill, The Story of LLCs: Combining the Best
Features of a Flawed Business Tax Structure, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 295, 310 (Steven A.
Bank & Kirk J. Stark eds., 2005) (explaining the origins of LLCs and the impediments to
the form supplanting the corporate form).
37.
For a thoughtful empirical study of entity choice decisions, see Larry E.
Ribstein & Bruce H. Kobayashi, Choice of Form and Network Externalities, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 79 (2001).
38.
See, e.g., RIBSTEIN, supra note 28, at 225 (discussing use of LLC form by
private equity firms).
39.
See, e.g., John Bringardner, Sears Finds Security, IP L. & BUS., June 1, 2007,
available
at
http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1196280099819
(discussing
securitization to protect intellectual property).
40.
Victor Fleischer, Taxing Blackstone, 61 TAX L. REV. 89, 97 (2008)
(discussing the use of LLC form and related tax consequences).
41.
See, e.g., RIBSTEIN, supra note 28, at 6–9, 247–49 (observing flexibility in
contractual nature of LLC).
42.
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 7, at 585–86 (discussing empirical surveys
suggesting lack of meaningful negotiation in LLC operating agreements).
43.
See, e.g., RIBSTEIN, supra note 28, at 177–79 (discussing choice of fiduciary
duties in LLC form).
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related ventures. They may want flexibility to allocate time and resources among
the LLC and other ventures. They may simply find it more efficient from an
operations or cost perspective to rely on contract obligations, rather than fiduciary
law, to achieve their objectives. Of course, parties also may seek lax fiduciary
duties for illegitimate reasons, such as creating opportunities for self-dealing, and
this potential must be part of any policy discussion.44
Fiduciary duties are a basic component of general business law. A
fiduciary relationship generally arises where “one party to a fiduciary relation (the
entrustor) is dependent on the other (the fiduciary).”45 Traditionally, fiduciaries
were required to act solely in the best interests of their beneficiaries, even
foregoing compensation for their services in some early scenarios. 46 That strict
interpretation of a fiduciary relationship has eased over time, and a more relaxed
approach now may apply so long as the fiduciary is required to act substantially for
the benefit of others.47 Fiduciaries commonly owe a variety of duties to
beneficiaries, including duties of loyalty, care, and good faith.48
Although fiduciary duty law largely developed outside of the business
context,49 most states have incorporated fiduciary concepts into their corporate,
partnership, and other unincorporated laws, including LLC statutes. 50 The
contractual nature of LLCs does not necessarily preclude a fiduciary relationship
among parties to the Operating Agreement—the concept of entrustment underlying
fiduciary law may apply to the negotiated relationship. 51 Whether a fiduciary
relationship is an essential element of LLCs, however, is subject to debate and is
discussed further in Part I.B.2.
Most state LLC statutes address fiduciary duties among members and
managers in some respect, typically by establishing the scope of fiduciary duties or
by empowering parties to modify or eliminate duties. For example, the Illinois and
South Dakota LLC statutes, which are two of the handful of state statutes patterned
44.
See, e.g., Miller, supra note 7, at 595 (“The right to privately order LLC
relationships is not a license to exploit, steal, or lie.”).
45.
Tamar Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 800 (1983) (footnote
omitted); see also ERNEST VINTER, A TREATISE ON THE HISTORY AND LAW OF FIDUCIARY
RELATIONSHIP AND RESULTING TRUSTS: TOGETHER WITH A SELECTION OF SELECTED CASES 1
(3d ed. 1955) (explaining nature of fiduciary relationship).
46.
See VINTER, supra note 45, at 34.
47.
See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist
Shareholders, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1255, 1263–64 (2008).
48.
See FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 101–07 (discussing general duties of
fiduciaries).
49.
Blair & Stout, supra note 26 (discussing trust and the development of
fiduciary law in the corporate context).
50.
FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 50–52, 96–99; see also D. Gordon Smith, The
Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1441–47, 1450–87
(2002) (suggesting that fiduciary duties are most apt, including in business context, where
the duties protect a critical resource).
51.
See infra Part I.B.2 (discussing contractarian and anti-contractarian
perspectives).
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after the 1995 Uniform Limited Liability Company Act (revised in 1996), offer
guidance on both the duty of care and the duty of loyalty. 52 These statutes typically
provide that “[t]he only fiduciary duties a member [or manager] owes to a
member-managed company and its other members are the duty of loyalty and the
duty of care imposed by subsections (b) and (c).”53 The duty of loyalty generally is
defined as a duty to refrain from misappropriating the LLC’s property or
opportunities, competing with the LLC, or otherwise engaging in self-dealing.54
The duty of care generally is “limited to refraining from engaging in grossly
negligent or reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of
law.”55 Members and managers also are expected to exercise their duties consistent
with the obligations of good faith and fair dealing under these statutes. 56 With
respect to altering these fiduciary duties, the Illinois and South Dakota statutes are
slightly different,57 but they generally follow the 1996 Uniform Act by prohibiting
the complete elimination of fiduciary duties. 58 Notably, the 2006 Revised Uniform
Limited Liability Act adopts a strikingly different approach to fiduciary duties by
“uncabining” the duties owed by managing members and managers in LLCs. 59
Other states, such as Delaware and Massachusetts, and the American Bar
Association’s Prototype LLC Act, do not specifically identify fiduciary duties by
52.
See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/15-3 (2012); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A409 (2012).
53.
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 409(a), (h) (revised 1996), 6B U.L.A. 597
(2008).
54.
Id. § 409(b), (h).
55.
Id. § 409(c), (h).
56.
Id. § 409(d), (h).
57.
See 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 180/15-3; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-34A-409.
58.
Specifically, section 103 of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act
(“ULLCA”) provides in pertinent part:
The operating agreement may not:
....
(2) eliminate the duty of loyalty under Section 409(b) or 603(b)(3), but
the agreement may:
(i) identify specific types or categories of activities that do not
violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable; and
(ii) specify the number or percentage of members or
disinterested managers that may authorize or ratify, after full disclosure
of all material facts, a specific act or transaction that otherwise would
violate the duty of loyalty;
(3) unreasonably reduce the duty of care under Section 409(c) or
603(b)(3);
(4) eliminate the obligation of good faith and fair dealing under Section
409(d), but the operating agreement may determine the standards by
which the performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the
standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT § 103(b), 6B U.L.A. 563 (2008).
59.
REVISED UNIF. LTD. LIAB. CO. ACT §§ 110, 409 (revised 2006), 6B U.L.A.
443 (2008); see also Ribstein, supra note 6, at 62–63 (explaining the “uncabining” of duties
under the revised statute).
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or among members and managers. 60 Rather, these statutes address only the parties’
ability to affect the scope of any fiduciary duties by contract under the Operating
Agreement. For example, Delaware’s LLC statute provides:
A limited liability company agreement may provide for the
limitation or elimination of any and all liabilities for breach of
contract and breach of duties (including fiduciary duties) of a
member, manager or other person to a limited liability company or
to another member or manager or to another person that is a party to
or is otherwise bound by a limited liability company agreement;
provided, that a limited liability company agreement may not limit
or eliminate liability for any act or omission that constitutes a bad
faith violation of the implied contractual covenant of good faith and
fair dealing.61

Still, other state statutes do not specifically discuss fiduciary duties in any
respect.62
Courts and commentators have struggled with the fiduciary nature of the
LLC form.63 The long tradition of characterizing partners, directors, and certain
managers as fiduciaries of the businesses with which they are associated creates a
presumption—or at least a default rule—that LLC members and managers should
be treated similarly. The following sections explore the potential tension between
allowing parties to do business by contract in the LLC form and imposing
fiduciary duties in that contractual relationship by decisional or statutory law.
B. Respecting the Contractual Nature of the LLC Form
LLC statutes typically include a few mandatory rules but largely provide
default rules to govern the parties’ relationship in the absence of an expressed
agreement of the parties. The structure and substance of these statutes, including
their approach to fiduciary duties, often is informed by the state’s partnership and
limited partnership statutes.64 Moreover, in considering the fiduciary nature of
LLCs, some courts look to traditional corporate governance law to fill gaps and
ambiguity in the parties’ agreement.65 Courts and commentators debate whether
60.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-1101 to -1109 (2005 & Supp. 2010) (Delaware
Limited Liability Company Act); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156C, §§ 1–72 (2005 & Supp.
2011) (Massachusetts Limited Liability Company Act); REVISED PROTOTYPE LTD. LIAB. CO.
ACT (2011).
61.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(e).
62.
See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 4A-101 (2012).
63.
See infra Parts I.B.1–2.
64.
See generally RIBSTEIN, supra note 28, at 131–32, 177–78 (discussing
development of LLC statutes and fiduciary duty provisions).
65.
Compare Feeley v. NHAOCG, LLC, C.A. No. 7304-VCL, 2012 WL
966944, at *6–8 (Del. Ch. Mar. 20, 2012) (choosing to fill gaps with corporate law), with
JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. KB Home, 632 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1024–27 (D. Nev. 2009)
(refusing to fill default duties the Nevada legislature excluded), and In re South Canaan
Cellular Invs., LLC, 427 B.R. 85, 102–03 (E.D. Pa. 2010) (reaching same result and not
imposing default duties). See also Michael K. Molitor, Eat Your Vegetables (or at Least
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such gap-filling techniques are appropriate in the LLC context or whether the LLC
form is different than its predecessor business entities. Particularly, the debate
focuses on whether the LLC is truly intended to be purely contractual, rather than
fiduciary, in nature. This Section considers the debate and identifies the related
questions explored through the OA Study in Part II.
1. Gap-Filling Approaches Used by Courts
Courts have struggled with the treatment of LLCs since their inception.
Commenting on this issue in the Delaware courts, Chief Justice Myron T. Steele of
the Delaware Supreme Court posited that “courts should look to the parties’
agreement and apply a contractual analysis rather than analogizing to traditional
notions of corporate governance” when dealing with unincorporated business
entities.66 Although an easy principle to articulate, many courts vacillate between
enforcing the parties’ Operating Agreements as written in accordance with general
contract law and supplementing the parties’ agreements with traditional fiduciary
law.67
For the most part, courts enforce tailored limitations of traditional
fiduciary duties among the members or among the LLC and the members in the
Operating Agreement.68 However, if conduct falls outside of the fiduciary
limitations specifically contemplated by the Operating Agreement or if the
contractual language is too broad or ambiguous, courts often default to traditional
fiduciary law.69 For example, a Kentucky court imposed a duty of loyalty where

Understand Why You Should): Can Better Warning and Education of Prospective Minority
Owners Reduce Oppression in Closely Held Businesses?, 14 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L.
491, 494 (2009) (finding that LLC law is evolving to include traditional corporate remedies
including dissolution and breach of fiduciary duty claims).
66.
Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 1, 25 (2007)
(observing that Delaware cases “demonstrate a reluctance to come to grips with the reality
that the contractual relationship between parties to limited partnership and limited liability
company agreements should be the analytical focus for resolving governance disputes-not
the status relationship of the parties”).
67.
See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Crothall, C.A. No. 6001-VCP, 2012 WL 707238, at
*6–7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 2012) (using traditional corporate governance principles rather than
contract interpretation principles to analyze the meaning of “recklessness” in an operating
agreement’s exculpation provision).
68.
See CNL-AB LLC v. E. Prop. Fund I SPE (MS Ref) LLC, C.A. No. 6137VCP, 2011 WL 353529, at *9 (Del. Ch. Jan. 28, 2011) (enforcing contractual limitation on
fiduciary duties); Kelly v. Blum, No. 4516-VCP, 2010 WL 629850, at *10–17 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 24, 2010) (enforcing the limitation that eliminated liability for all conduct except
willful misconduct, but denying the motion to dismiss to determine whether the conduct fell
within the express limitations).
69.
See, e.g., Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839, 850–51
(Del. Ch. 2012) (holding that managers of an LLC are fiduciaries for the LLC and its
members and also explaining that absent contractual modification, LLC managers owe
traditional fiduciary duties under the law of equity). In Gatz, the Delaware Chancery Court
explained, “Thus, because the LLC Act provides for principles of equity to apply, because
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the Operating Agreement and LLC statute were silent and the managing member
usurped corporate opportunities.70
No one factor appears to trigger court-imposed fiduciary duties in the
LLC context. The circumstances vary and produce fact-specific decisions. For
example, in General Growth Properties, the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the Southern District of New York interpreted certain LLC operating agreements
in a manner that, according to the parties, failed to honor the contracting parties’
intent to structure the LLCs as bankruptcy-remote entities.71 The relevant
provision provided: “To the extent permitted by law . . . the Independent Managers
shall consider only the interests of the Company, including its respective creditors,
in acting . . . .”72 The court read “to the extent permitted by law” as requiring the
LLC managers to comply with Delaware corporation law and consider the interests
of owners in exercising fiduciary duties.73 Consequently, despite the bankruptcyremote structure and the language arguably allowing managers to consider only the
interests of the company and its creditors, the court directed the managers to
consider the interests of the LLC’s parent corporations.74

LLC managers are clearly fiduciaries, and because fiduciaries owe the fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care, the LLC Act starts with the default that managers of LLCs owe
enforceable fiduciary duties.” Id. at 851. Courts also appear willing to imply a duty of good
faith into operating agreements, regardless of any contractual waivers. Id. at 851.
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether good faith in this context is imposed under contract or
fiduciary law. For an explanation of the different standards, see Smith, supra note 50, at
1488–89.
70.
Patmon v. Hobbs, 280 S.W.3d 589, 593–96 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).
71.
In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43, 63 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). A
bankruptcy-remote entity is “[a] business entity formed in a manner designed to minimize
the risk of becoming a debtor in a bankruptcy case.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed.
2009). General Growth Properties filed for chapter 11 bankruptcy in April 2009,
representing the largest real estate bankruptcy case in U.S. history with approximately $27
billion in debt. GENERAL GROWTH PROPERTIES, INC. (FORM 10-K), at F-7 (February 27,
2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/895648/000095015209001871/
c48762e10vk.htm#304; Daniel Taub & Brian Louis, General Growth Files Biggest U.S.
Property Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 16, 2009, 2:18 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=anaZwxRpYcTw (last visited Sept. 28, 2012).
Accordingly, the treatment of the LLC operating agreements in the General Growth
Properties chapter 11 case significantly impacted the rights of the parties relying on those
contracts. See generally In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. 43.
72.
In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 63. Another example of a court
interpretation that likely was not anticipated by the parties under the Operating Agreement
is Auriga Capital Corp. v. Gatz Props., LLC, 40 A.3d 839 (Del. Ch. 2012). In Gatz, the
Delaware Chancery Court construed two contractual provisions—an affiliate agreement
clause and an exculpatory clause—narrowly and imposed monetary damages on the
manager for breaches of common law fiduciary duties owed to minority investors. Id. at
857–59.
73.
In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., 409 B.R. at 64.
74.
Courts generally decline to recognize creditors as beneficiaries of an
operating agreement absent express language in the agreement. See, e.g., CML V, LLC v.
Bax, 28 A.3d. 1037, 1041–43 (Del. 2011) (denying derivative standing to creditors of an
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Another court implied common law fiduciary duties under language that
said:
[W]henever a potential conflict of interest exists or arises between
any Affiliate of the Company, on the one hand, and the Company or
any Group Member, on the other, any resolution or course of action
by the Board of Directors in respect of such conflict of interest shall
be permitted and deemed approved by all Members, and shall not
constitute a breach of this Agreement . . . or of any duty existing at
law, in equity or otherwise, including any fiduciary duty . . . .75

The court noted that the relevant party was both an affiliate of the company and
the company’s controlling owner.76 Therefore, if the LLC agreement did not
explicitly address a controlling owner, that party as a controlling shareholder owed
the “traditional fiduciary duties that controlling shareholders owe minority
shareholders.”77
The tendency of courts to construe fiduciary limitations narrowly and to
be suspicious of provisions purporting to eliminate all fiduciary duties is
understandable given the long tradition of treating business partners and managers
as fiduciaries.78 Nevertheless, the courts’ fluctuation between contract and
fiduciary law in the LLC context creates uncertainty and additional costs for
parties invoking the LLC form.79 It also raises important policy considerations
regarding the appropriate scope and content of LLC statutes. Do we want to allow
parties to create business relationships in a purely contractual, rather than
fiduciary, form? If yes, or even if maybe, do we want that contractual form to be
available to all parties and businesses? The following Subsection summarizes the
general thoughts of commentators on these issues. The remainder of the Article
then considers them in light of the OA Study and trust theory.
2. The Ongoing Fiduciary Debate Among Commentators
Many commentators have discussed the fiduciary nature of business
relationships and the policy concerns underlying waivers of fiduciary duties in

insolvent LLC). The impact of the “freedom of contract principle” on creditors of an LLC
raises interesting issues that are beyond the scope of this Article.
75.
In re Atlas Energy Res., LLC, C.A. No. 4589–VCN, 2010 WL 4273122, at
*7 (Del. Ch. Oct. 28, 2010).
76.
Id. In fact, the court distinguished this case from another LLC Agreement
that read “whenever a potential conflict of interest exists or arises between the General
Partner or any of its Affiliates, on the one hand.” Id. at *8 (quoting Brickell Partners v.
Wise, 794 A.2d 1, 2 (Del. Ch. 2001)).
77.
Id. at *9 (quoting Kelly v. Blum, Civil Action No. 4516–VCP, 2010 WL
629850, at *12 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010)).
78.
This approach also is consistent with the general drafting principle that
limitations on fiduciary duties are strictly construed. See, e.g., Gotham Partners, L.P. v.
Hallwood Realty Partners, L.P., 817 A.2d 160, 171–72 (Del. 2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY § 8.06 (2006).
79.
See Seita, supra note 20.
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unincorporated business forms, such as the LLC.80 This Article does not seek to
rehash the fiduciary debate. Rather, it offers new and meaningful data and
perspective on the relevant issues and proposes a workable solution for
policymakers.81 Nevertheless, this Subsection summarizes the fiduciary debate and
prior empirical surveys concerning LLC governance to provide necessary
background and context for the remainder of the Article.
Whether characterized as contractual or common law, fiduciary duties
generally apply to partners and managers in most business relationships. 82 The
scope of duties is not, however, identical or consistent among business entities.
Partners generally can define the scope of their duties to the partnership and each
other through their partnership agreement.83 This tailored approach to duties finds
support in common law agency principles. 84 Consequently, partners may contract
for something less than the “utmost duty of loyalty” traditionally expected of
fiduciaries, particularly in the common law trust context. 85
Directors and officers of corporations tend to fall between the strict
fiduciary standards applied to trustees in the trust context and the more malleable
standards applicable to partners and even the common law agency relationship. 86 A
key difference between the corporate and partnership standards is the inability of
most parties to negotiate in any meaningful way regarding the scope of fiduciary
duties in the corporate setting. Accordingly, although the close corporation may
warrant separate analysis, fiduciary duties in the corporate context generally are
not subject to waiver ex ante by the parties.87

80.
See Sandra K. Miller, Legal Realism, the LLC, and a Balanced Approach to
the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 729, 732–
33 (2010) (summarizing four approaches to fiduciary duties in the LLC context: mandatory
duties of care and loyalty, duties of care and loyalty subject to modification, duties of care
and loyalty subject to elimination, and no fiduciary duties).
81.
See infra Part II.
82.
See Blair & Stout, supra note 26, at 1781–82 (summarizing contractarian and
anti-contractarian views about fiduciary duties). See generally FRANKEL, supra note 1, at
229–42 (describing debate and endorsing fiduciary law concept); Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L. & ECON. 425, 427 (1993)
(endorsing contract approach); Larry E. Ribstein, Fencing Fiduciary Duties, 91 B.U. L.
REV. 899, 901–03 (2011) (describing the debate and endorsing the contract approach).
83.
UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103 (amended 1997), 6 Pt. 1 U.L.A. 73 (2001) (allowing
certain modifications to fiduciary duties).
84.
See Ribstein, supra note 82, at 902–04.
85.
See id.
86.
See, e.g., Stone ex rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362,
366–70 (Del. 2006) (explaining directors’ fiduciary duties); FRANKEL, supra note 1, at 50–
52 (same).
87.
See, e.g., In re CLK Energy Partners, LLC, Bankruptcy No. 09-50616,
Adversary No. 09-5042, 2010 WL 1930065, at *8 (Bankr. W.D. La. May 12, 2010) (“[T]he
application of fiduciary duties in the case of a Delaware LLC differs from the application of
those duties in the corporate context. Fiduciary obligations in the corporate context are
based on the ‘status’ of the parties, while the duties owed by an individual who manages or
controls an LLC is governed by contract.”). Notably, in unincorporated business forms, the
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As described above, many LLC statutes allow parties to modify or even
eliminate fiduciary duties in the LLC form. 88 Supporters of this approach
emphasize the contractual nature of the relationship and the ability of parties to
bargain over the scope of, among other things, the parties’ fiduciary duties.89
Critics highlight limitations on bargaining power and the inability of some
members to protect or extract themselves from an abusive situation. 90 As with
most good debates, each side raises valid points, making it difficult for
policymakers to determine the optimal default rule.
Surprisingly few commentators have evaluated the issues at the core of
the fiduciary debate empirically. The dearth of empirical studies likely is due to the
challenges in obtaining relevant data and designing meaningful studies, as
discussed in Part II. Accordingly, the existing empirical studies focus primarily on
survey data collected from lawyers forming LLCs and the number of LLCs
organized in various states.91

duty of loyalty typically garners the most attention, as parties frequently share ownership
and management functions and have interests in other, similar ventures. See supra Part
I.B.1; infra Part II.B.3.
88.
See supra Part I.A.2.
89.
See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, On the Elimination of Fiduciary Duties: A Theory
of Good Faith for Unincorporated Firms, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 123, 124–30 (2006)
(arguing that the Delaware courts’ understanding of contractual good faith is appropriate in
the context of LLCs); Myron T. Steele, Freedom of Contract and Default Contractual
Duties in Delaware Limited Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 46 AM. BUS.
L.J. 221, 222–25 (2009) (arguing in favor of complete freedom of contract); Ribstein, supra
note 16 (same).
90.
See, e.g., Sandra K. Miller, What Buy-Out Rights, Fiduciary Duties, and
Dissolution Remedies Should Apply in the Case of the Minority Owner of a Limited Liability
Company, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 413, 435–37 (2001) [hereinafter Miller, Remedies]
(arguing for preservation of default rules allowing investors to exit in LLC context); Sandra
K. Miller, Fiduciary Duties in the LLC: Mandatory Core Duties to Protect the Interests of
Others Beyond the Contracting Parties, 46 AM. BUS. L.J. 243, 244–46 (2009) [hereinafter
Miller, Fiduciary Duties] (recommending mandatory fiduciary duties); Douglas K. Moll,
supra note 17, at 958–59 (raising minority oppression concerns similar to those in close
corporations); see also Lyman Johnson, Delaware’s Non-Waivable Duties, 91 B.U. L. REV.
701, 702–03 (2011) (arguing that Delaware’s statute allowing parties to waive fiduciary
duties is unconstitutional).
91.
For an example of an empirical study of LLC filings, see Chrisman, supra
note 31, at 462 (observing a strong dominance of the LLC form in all areas other than
“publicly traded companies, companies that plan to become publicly traded companies, and
non-profit entities”). See also Ribstein & Kobayashi, supra note 37, at 121–28 (empirical
study of entity choice decisions). In addition, an empirical study of publicly traded LLCs
conducted while the OA Study was ongoing presents interesting and, in some respects, very
similar findings despite the different nature of the LLCs included in the database and
analyzed in that study. See Mohsen Manesh, Contractual Freedom Under Delaware
Alternative Entity Law: Evidence from Publicly Traded LPs and LLCs, 37 J. CORP. L. 555,
558 (2012) (“[N]otwithstanding the ongoing academic debate, as a practical matter,
fiduciary traditionalists have lost the battle to protect fiduciary duties from contract—at
least in the publicly traded sphere.”).
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Professor Sandra Miller conducted two empirical surveys on LLC
governance issues.92 Her surveys targeted lawyers in various states who
represented clients in business-entity-choice and -formation matters. A greater
percentage of lawyers in both studies reported representing majority or controlling
holders in LLCs on a fairly regular basis. 93 As Miller subsequently observed,
“[b]oth studies challenge the notion that most LLC owners retain attorneys who
thoughtfully draft LLC operating agreements tailored to the specifics of their
business arrangements.”94 Among other things, her studies suggest that many
lawyers forming LLCs think of the Operating Agreement as a form document, fail
to appreciate the nuances of fiduciary law, and do not necessarily understand
applicable LLC law in their respective jurisdictions. 95
The OA Study and the subsequent discussion of trust theory build on the
extant LLC literature to offer a multi-factor test for assessing the desirability of
fiduciary waivers in the LLC form.

II. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF LLC GOVERNANCE PROVISIONS
LLCs are governed largely by privately negotiated contracts. Although
the private contractual nature of the LLC form provides parties with flexibility in
designing governance structures, it makes analyzing the use and impact of LLCs
challenging. LLCs generally are not required to file their Operating Agreements
with state or federal agencies, and only the parties to the Operating Agreement
know the terms, unless or until litigation ensues. Accordingly, very little objective
information about LLCs in practice exists.
This Article fills that void and presents an in-depth empirical study of
actual Operating Agreements. The OA Study focuses on the governance provisions
of Operating Agreements but also provides other basic information about the
LLCs, including state of organization, membership structure, and industry to
which the LLC belongs. As explained below, the OA Study is limited by, among
other things, the pool of publicly available Operating Agreements. Nevertheless,
the OA Study contributes new and meaningful information to the LLC debate and
complements the thoughtful theoretical and survey work previously done by others
in the field.96

92.
See Sandra K. Miller, A New Direction for LLC Research in a Contractarian
Legal Environment, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 351 (2003) [hereinafter Miller, New Direction];
Sandra K. Miller et al., An Empirical Glimpse into Limited Liability Companies: Assessing
the Need to Protect Minority Investors, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 609 (2006) [hereinafter Miller, An
Empirical Glimpse].
93.
In the 2003 study, 56% of respondents reported representing majority
investors while 20% reported representing minority investors. Miller, New Direction, supra
note 92, at 388. In the 2006 study, 84% of respondents reported representing controlling
investors while 67% reported representing minority investors. Miller et al., An Empirical
Glimpse, supra note 92, at 627.
94.
Miller, supra note 80, at 739.
95.
See id. at 738–40 (describing general findings in two surveys).
96.
See supra Part I.B.2.
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This Part first describes the methodology and scope of the OA Study. It
then presents the key data and findings. In discussing the data, this Part draws on
prior literature to add context and develop meaningful inferences. This discussion
informs the policy analysis that follows in Part III.
A. Study Methodology
The Authors devoted substantial time to designing the parameters of the
database and the scope of the OA Study. Among other issues, the Authors had to
identify a reliable source to access Operating Agreements and then tailor the
study’s design to the available information. Given the limited availability of
Operating Agreements and the Authors’ desire to perform a thorough study with
broad application, the Authors conducted an extensive review of all 150 Operating
Agreements ultimately included in the database created for this study.
1. Creating the Database
Operating Agreements typically are not filed with the Secretary of State
or other appropriate agencies in the state of the LLC’s organization.97 As a result,
no single, readily available source of Operating Agreements exists. Rather,
Operating Agreements generally are available only through indirect means, such as
by making specific requests to the LLC, searching public dockets to identify
litigation in which Operating Agreements have been filed as exhibits, or
identifying public companies that have filed Operating Agreements with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”).
The Authors decided to use filings with the SEC to populate the database.
They based this decision on a number of factors, including the ability to search and
identify relevant Operating Agreements electronically through the EDGAR Pro
Online service. The primary drawback to this approach is that it limited the types
of Operating Agreements included in the database. Operating Agreements
typically are filed with the SEC if one or more of the signatories to the agreement
are public companies.98 Accordingly, the database does not necessarily represent
Operating Agreements negotiated or executed in small business LLCs or LLCs
organized primarily by individuals as opposed to entities. This limitation and the
utility of the OA Study in light of it are discussed in Part II.B.1.

97.
While the formation of the LLC generally requires a formal, filed document
with the state, it is not required that the operating agreement complementing the articles of
organization be made public. See, e.g., 1 LARRY E. RIBSTEIN & ROBERT R. KEATINGE,
RIBSTEIN AND KEATINGE ON LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES § 4:16 (2012).
98.
See, e.g., The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors,
Maintains
Market
Integrity,
and
Facilitates
Capital
Formation,
SEC,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified July 30, 2012) (“[T]he SEC
requires public companies to disclose meaningful financial and other information to the
public. . . . [S]ecurities sold in the U.S. must be registered. . . . These [registration]
statements and the accompanying prospectuses become public shortly after filing, and
investors can access them using EDGAR.”).
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The Authors used a number of searches and techniques to identify
references to Operating Agreements in SEC filings and then to locate copies of the
actual agreements.99 These searches yielded 446 documents that referenced the
search terms in some manner. The Authors and one of their two coders combed
through each of these references and eliminated duplicates and irrelevant
agreements. The Authors then endeavored to locate copies of the Operating
Agreements in the remaining references, creating a database containing 150
Operating Agreements.100
Given the relatively small pool of Operating Agreements and the inherent
limitations on the nature of the parties involved with these LLCs, the Authors
opted not to limit the pool further through a random selection process. Rather, the
Authors reviewed and coded all 150 Operating Agreements to maximize the data
available for analysis.
2. The Study’s Design and Scope
The Authors also devoted significant time to defining, testing, revising,
and finalizing all variable names and labels that, together, comprise the project
codebook. The Authors developed an initial codebook and tested it on three
Operating Agreements. The Authors then distributed the codebook to two other
coders, reviewed it with them, and revised it based on their feedback. The Authors
and coders tested the codebook by coding Operating Agreements not included in
the database. After this exercise, the Authors and coders met to review the test
coding results. The Authors revised the codebook based on the results and followup conversations with the coders. Next, the Authors repeated this process three
times, resulting in a final codebook consisting of 58 primary variables and an
acceptable level of inter-coder reliability.101
The primary variables included in the codebook cover the following
general categories: background information, management structure, fiduciary
duties and any exculpation of members or managers, third-party governance rights,
indemnification provisions, and transferability of membership interests. The
variables within each category then identified specific information. For example,
coders identified whether the Operating Agreements addressed fiduciary duties
and, if so, how they were addressed. Coders considered whether third parties held
any veto, consent, or other rights with respect to the governance or operations of
99.
Specifically, the Authors searched targeted portions of EDGAR Pro Online’s
“Annual Report Sections” and “Current Event (8-K) Sections” libraries for the ten-year
period of 2001–2011.
100.
The majority of Operating Agreements were executed after 2004, likely
because of the prevalence of paper filings prior to that time. The percentage of agreements
by year are as follows: 1995 (0.7%), 1996 (0.7%), 1997 (2.7%), 1998 (2%), 1999 (0.7%),
2000 (2.7%), 2001 (4%), 2002 (4.7%), 2003 (2%), 2004 (4.7%), 2005 (8.7%), 2006
(19.3%), 2007 (16%), 2008 (8.7%), 2009 (7.3%), 2010 (9.3%), unknown (6.0%).
101.
The primary variables were broken down further into sub-variables to
remove subjective judgment from the coding process. In addition, the Authors designed and
monitored a Web-based entry system to reduce coder error throughout the process. Coders
also double-coded cases to insure inter-coder reliability during the actual study.
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the LLC. They also analyzed the scope of any indemnification, buy-out, and rightof-first-refusal provisions. Coders thoroughly reviewed each Operating Agreement
randomly assigned to them. Moreover, Operating Agreements were double-coded
throughout the process to maintain an acceptable level of inter-coder reliability.
Upon completion of the coding process, the Authors reviewed and
reconciled any inconsistencies in the database. This process required only minor
changes throughout the database. The Authors then commenced their analysis of
the data. The following discussion presents the key data and findings, as well as a
contextual analysis of particular Operating Agreement provisions, to facilitate a
deeper exploration of the data.
B. Key Data and Findings
Several assumptions underlie the perceived value of the LLC form:
Parties will actively negotiate the terms governing their business relationship;
parties will be fully informed and frequently represented by counsel in these
negotiations; and parties can adequately assess, allocate, and price risk ex ante
without the intervention of legislators or judges.102 Under these assumptions,
private ordering of LLC business relationships is more conducive to cooperation
and profitability than alternatives. As discussed in Part I.B.2, however,
commentators have questioned whether this theory holds in practice. Indeed,
Miller’s research suggests that it does not.103
The question then becomes whether the assumptions underlying the LLC
form are flawed for all business relationships or only some. If the latter possibility
is correct, policymakers may need to reevaluate the types of businesses eligible for
the LLC or other business entity forms. It may be time to rationalize business
entity law by promoting private ordering in varying degrees depending on the
nature of the underlying business relationship. The Authors designed the OA Study
to help inform responses to these important questions.
The data show that parties electing to form LLCs are invoking the
flexibility in structuring firm governance permitted under many state statutes.
Notably, however, these governance modifications are not uniform. Rather, they
suggest intentional decisions—for example, modifying the duty of loyalty but not
the duty of care or modifying managers’ duties but preserving members’ ability to
modify or amend the Operating Agreement. Similarly, many of the provisions
suggest negotiated language, as opposed to language simply opting out of the
statutory default rules. Although it is impossible to determine the level of active
negotiation or the parties’ knowledge base from the Operating Agreements, the
data do demonstrate certain inferences. As discussed in Part II.C, these inferences
allow consideration of the value of private ordering in the LLC context and the

102.
See RIBSTEIN, supra note 28, at 2–8; Sandra K. Miller, What Fiduciary
Duties Should Apply to the LLC Manager After More than a Decade of Experimentation?,
32 J. CORP. L. 565, 580 (2007) (describing these factors as the contractarian theory of
LLCs).
103.
See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
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potential cost of allowing certain parties or courts to unilaterally change the
bargain ex post.
1. Background Data
The majority of LLCs in the database are organized under the laws of the
state of Delaware (56.7%), with California (12%) and Nevada (7.3%) representing
the state of organization for most of the remaining LLCs (see Table 1).104 In
identifying the 150 agreements included in the database, the Authors eliminated
duplicates. Nevertheless, the Authors retained Operating Agreements amended
either in full or in part to allow a substantive review of these agreements.
Table 1: State of LLC Organization
State

Original Sample
(n=150)
n
%

Analytic Sample
(n=129)
n
%

Delaware
California
Nevada
Maryland
Arizona
Iowa
Colorado
Indiana
New York
Ohio
Texas
Florida
Illinois
Michigan
Missouri
Virginia
Wisconsin
Unknown

85
18
11
6
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
8

76
16
11
3
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

56.7
12.0
7.3
4.0
2.0
2.0
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
1.3
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
0.7
5.3

58.9
12.4
8.5
2.3
2.3
2.3
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
1.6
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8
0.8

Accordingly, the database includes 64 (42.7%) original Operating
Agreements, 65 (43.3%) amended and restated Operating Agreements, and 21
(14%) amended Operating Agreements (see Figure 1). After reviewing and coding
all 150 Operating Agreements, the Authors determined that the 21 amended
Operating Agreements lacked meaningful substantive data, and they excluded
these 21 agreements from the data analysis presented below.
104.
As explained infra, most of the data analysis is performed only on original
Operating Agreements or amended and restated Operating Agreements (amendments only
were excluded). The distribution of the states of organization for the 129 Operating
Agreements is similar to that for all 150 agreements: Delaware (58.9%); California (12.4%);
Nevada (8.5%).
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Figure 1. Type of Operating Agreement (n=150)

14.0%
43.3%
42.7%

Amended and Restated

Original

Amended

For the remaining 129 Operating Agreements, the overwhelming majority
(89.9%) were executed among five or fewer parties.105 Although many of these
agreements had procedures for admitting additional members, all but nine of the
agreements indicated that they identified all current members in the LLC. 106 Only
16 of the LLCs included individual members and only 32 of the LLCs included
some type of financial institution as a member. The majority (83.7%) of LLCs
instead had some type of for-profit business entity as a member, with 69 LLCs
having a corporate member, 62 having an LLC member, and 12 having a limited
partnership member.107
The LLCs in the database operate in a variety of industries. For example,
22.5% involve businesses in the transportation, electric, gas, oil, or utility
industries; 19.4% involve real estate ventures; 17.1% involve finance or financial
investment vehicles; and 11.6% involve communication, entertainment, and
gambling ventures. In addition, the database includes several LLCs operating in
the manufacturing, mining, retailing, and services industries (see Figure 2).108
105.
Most LLCs reported two members (61.2%), with 12 (9.3%) reporting one
member, 12 (9.3%) reporting three members, seven (5.4%) reporting four members, six
(4.7%) reporting five members, and the remaining four (3.2%) reporting six or more
members. For this variable, seven agreements did not provide the relevant information.
106.
Specifically, 90.7% of the Operating Agreements purported to identify all
current members. For this variable, three agreements did not provide the relevant
information.
107.
For this variable, five agreements did not provide the relevant information.
Note also that some agreements indicated having more than one type of for-profit business
entity as a member.
108.
Specifically, the database includes 5.4% in manufacturing, 5.4% in mining,
and 16.3% in retail or services. Additional industries in the database are agriculture,
forestry, and fishing which constitute 1.6%.
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Figure 2. LLC Industry (n=129)

11.6%
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16.3%
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Real Estate
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As acknowledged earlier, the LLCs included in the database do not
represent all types of parties or businesses that might elect to organize as an LLC.
That limitation actually might lend additional value to the OA Study, however, in
that the study population should more closely mirror parties who satisfy the
assumptions underlying the purported value of private ordering in the LLC context
(for example that LLCs are organized by represented, sophisticated, and fully
informed parties).109 To the extent the OA Study highlights potential weaknesses
in those underlying assumptions, it is reasonable to infer an even greater weakness
in the types of small or start-up businesses not necessarily represented in the
database. The resulting implications of the OA Study are discussed in Part II.C.
2. Management and Fiduciary Duty Data
In many states, parties organizing an LLC can elect to be managed by the
members themselves or by third-party managers.110 The parties can further tailor
their management structures so that members in a member-managed structure have
either unequal-management rights or a centralized-management form that includes
non-member managers.111 This flexibility is grounded in the freedom of contract
109.
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
110.
See, e.g., 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 97, § 8:2 (explaining statutory
default rules for centralized (designated managers) or decentralized (member management)
management and stating that “decentralized management is the general rule in LLCs and
centralized management the exception”).
111.
Id. § 8:3 (“[T]he parties also can agree to delegate management authority to a
single member, or to an outside manager even in a member-managed firm.” (footnotes
omitted)); id. § 8:4 (“[When there is centralized management] LLC statutes should and
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principle underlying the LLC form. But it also may be expressed in a state’s statute
or recognized by applicable common law. Unless a specific management structure
is expressly prohibited by applicable law, the parties to the Operating Agreement
can consent to any variety of management structures.
Moreover, as described in Part I.A, parties also have some ability to
define the scope and nature of any fiduciary duties owed among the parties. The
extent of permissible modifications depends largely on applicable state law. This
subsection considers both the governance structures and level of fiduciary duties
selected by parties to the database Operating Agreements. It further considers any
association among these seemingly related factors.
a. Management Structures
The OA Study set “member-managed” and “manager-managed” as the
two primary governance structures for coding purposes. It then further dissected
each LLC’s governance structure by asking particular questions about the
involvement of members in the management and operation of the LLC. This multilevel approach allowed coders to capture variations in the two basic management
structures.
The LLCs in the database were fairly evenly divided between membermanaged (46.5%) and manager-managed (53.5%) governance structures (see
Figure 3). Only 31.7% of the member-managed LLCs included all members in the
management authority allocated under the agreement. The remaining 68.3% vested
management rights in one or a few of the LLC members. Likewise, only 24.6% of
the manager-managed LLCs involved one or more members in management
decisions.112 The remaining 75.4% of the manager-managed LLCs were managed
primarily by third parties. In 91.3% of the manager-managed LLCs, the Operating
Agreement allocated all management decisions to the managers (as opposed to
only decisions on day-to-day or operational matters or some other defined or
limited authority).113

often do require member approval of at least some manager actions in the absence of
contrary agreement.”).
112.
Moreover, 14 of the 17 LLCs involving a member in a manager-managed
governance structure identified a for-profit business entity as the active member. The other
three LLCs involved either an individual or a financial institution as the active member.
113.
For this variable, one agreement did not provide the relevant information.
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Figure 3. Management Type (n=129)
Member Not
Identified as
Manager,
75.4%

MemberManaged,
46.5%

ManagerManaged,
53.5%

Member
Identified as
Manager,
24.6%

Coders also identified whether the Operating Agreement appointed a
formal board or committee of managers to assist in the management of the LLC.
Parties invoked this type of centralized governing body in 40.3% of the Operating
Agreements. In most instances (75%), the board or committee was similar in
identity or duties to the managers of the LLC. The remaining LLCs in this
category (23.1%) frequently used the board or committee to review decisions of
the managers and members.114 Manager-managed agreements were significantly
more likely than member-managed agreements to appoint a governing body
(56.5% versus 21.7%, respectively; p<.001) (see Figure 4).
Figure 4. Whether Governing Body Appointed per Operating Agreement by
Management Type
100.0%
78.3%

80.0%

56.5%

60.0%

43.5%
40.0%
21.7%
20.0%
0.0%
Member-Managed
Yes

Manager-Managed
No

114.
For this variable, one agreement appointing a governing body did not
provide the relevant information.
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b. General Fiduciary Duties
A large majority of the database Operating Agreements (72.9%) modified
or purported to eliminate any fiduciary duty of loyalty owed by members. In
addition, 68.2% of the agreements expressly authorized members to compete in
some manner with the LLC or other members. Nevertheless, only 8.5% of the
agreements purported to modify or eliminate any fiduciary duty of care owing
among members.
The data are very similar with respect to the fiduciary duties of managers.
Operating Agreements in the database modified or purported to eliminate
managers’ duty of loyalty in 56.6% of the agreements and managers’ duty of care
in only 9.3% of the agreements. These data include fiduciary duty provisions for
both member-managed and manager-managed LLCs. If an Operating Agreement
governing a member-managed LLC included a fiduciary duty provision applicable
only to members involved in the management of the LLC, those provisions were
coded as manager-specific.
To isolate any effects from the management structure, the Authors
performed a variety of regression analyses to indentify variables that influenced
whether the LLC was member-managed or manager-managed and the scope of any
fiduciary duty provisions in the Operating Agreement. The LLC’s management
structure did not significantly affect whether the LLC purported to modify or
eliminate fiduciary duties for members or managers (see Figure 5).115
Figure 5. Fiduciary Modifications by Management Type
100.0%
80.0%

75.0%

71.0%

69.8%
62.3%

60.0%
40.0%
20.0%

8.3% 8.7%

7.1%

13.0%

0.0%
Members' Duty of
Loyalty

Members' Duty of Care
Member-Managed

Managers' Duty of
Loyalty

Managers' Duty of Care

Manager-Managed

115.
Member-managed LLCs modified members’ duty of loyalty in 75% of the
agreements, and manager-managed LLCs modified members’ duty of loyalty in 71% of the
agreements (p=.218). Member-managed LLCs modified members’ duty of care in 8.3% of
the agreements, while manager-managed LLCs modified members’ duty of care in 8.7% of
the agreements (p=.598). Member-managed LLCs modified managers’ duty of loyalty in
69.8% of the agreements, and manager-managed LLCs modified managers’ duty of loyalty
in 62.3% of the agreements (p=.305). Member-managed LLCs modified managers’ duty of
care in 7.1% of the agreements, and manager-managed LLCs modified managers’ duty of
care in 13% of the agreements (p=.578).
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c. Exculpation and Indemnification of Members and Managers
Most state statutes recognize the concept of “limited liability” for LLC
members and managers.116 Limited liability for members or managers typically
speaks only to their potential personal liability for the debts or other obligations of
the LLC to third parties. These statutory limited liability provisions typically state:
[N]o member of a limited liability company shall be personally
liable . . . for any debt, obligation, or liability of the limited liability
company, whether that liability or obligation arises in contract, tort,
or otherwise, solely by reason of being a member of the limited
liability company.117

Notably, limited liability in many instances does not protect members and
managers from personal liability to the LLC, members, or other beneficiaries of
the Operating Agreement. Members and managers might still be exposed to
liability for breaches of any fiduciary duties, breaches of contract, or other causes
of action that might exist among the parties and relate to the LLC.
Accordingly, coders also analyzed provisions in the database Operating
Agreements that purported to eliminate any personal liability of members or
managers to the LLC, members, or other beneficiaries of the Operating
Agreement. These provisions typically resemble an exculpatory provision included
for directors in a corporation’s charter.118 Both member-managed and managermanaged LLCs were more likely than not to eliminate personal liability of
managers (69.8% and 66.7%, respectively) and less likely to eliminate personal
liability of members (45% and 39.1%, respectively). Again, the type of
management structure did not significantly affect whether the Operating
Agreement included this type of exculpation provision for either members or
managers (p=.733 and p=.500, respectively) (see Figure 6).

116.
117.
118.

See, e.g., 1 RIBSTEIN & KEATINGE, supra note 97, § 12:2.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 17101(a) (2012).
For an example of a provision from an Operating Agreement, see LIMITED
LIABILITY COMPANY OPERATING AGREEMENT OF MT. HAMILTON LLC § 5.5, at 26 (Dec. 22,
2010) [hereinafter MT. HAMILTON], available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/
data/917225/000091722510000022/exh992.htm (“[T]he Manager shall not be liable or
responsible to the Company or any Member and shall not be in breach or default of its
duties under this Agreement for any act or omission (a) that is not caused by or attributable
to the Manager’s willful misconduct or gross negligence . . . .”). For an example of a
corporate exculpation provision, see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2012).
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Figure 6. Limitation or Elimination of Personal Liability by Management
Type
100.0%
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Managers to Others
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Even though neither the number nor type of members involved with the
LLC significantly impacted the governance structure or scope of any fiduciary
duty provisions, the type of member did influence exculpation clauses.
Specifically, LLCs with at least one for-profit member were significantly more
likely to eliminate the personal liability of members to others (including the LLC,
other members, or other beneficiaries) than were LLCs without a for-profit
member (45.4% vs. 18.8%, respectively; p=.044) (see Figure 7). This finding is
striking considering that, in the overall analysis, a majority of the Operating
Agreements did not include this type of protection for members (see Figure 7).119
Figure 7. Percent of Operating Agreements Limiting or Eliminating Personal
Liability of Members to Others by Number of For-Profit Members and
Overall
50.0%

45.4%

41.9%

40.0%
30.0%

18.8%

20.0%
10.0%
0.0%
One or More

None

Overall

119.
In the total population of 129 Operating Agreements, 41.9% purported to
eliminate the personal liability of members, while 58.1% did not.
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A similar finding emerged with respect to indemnification rights. A
majority of the database Operating Agreements (94.6%) included some form of
mandatory indemnification.120 The differences in indemnification related primarily
to who was covered by the provision. For example, 24% of the agreements
covered only members or members and their affiliates; 28.7% of the agreements
covered only managers or managers and their affiliates; and 34.9% of the
agreements covered some combination of members, managers, and their respective
affiliates.121
Further analysis of the indemnification data produced two interesting
findings. First, Operating Agreements eliminating members’ personal liability
through some type of exculpatory provision were significantly more likely than
agreements not eliminating that personal liability to also indemnify members or
members and their affiliates from liability relating to the LLC (40.7% versus 12%,
respectively; p<.001) (see Figure 8).122 Second, Operating Agreements modifying
or eliminating managers’ duty of loyalty were significantly more likely than
agreements not eliminating that duty to also indemnify managers or managers and
their affiliates from liability relating to the LLC (39.7% versus 12.8%,
respectively; p=.003) (see Figure 9).123

120.
The majority (78.3%) of the Operating Agreements included indemnification
clauses basically covering any potential or actual claims, litigation, or liability. For this
variable, six agreements did not provide the relevant information. Also, although the
majority of the Operating Agreements contained very broad indemnification language (for
example, indemnification for any potential, threatened or actual claims, litigation, or other
liability relating to the LLC), 80.6% of the agreements also contained some type of
exclusions. These exclusions typically provided that the LLC would not provide
indemnification for conduct that was in bad faith, illegal, constituted gross negligence,
reckless conduct or fraud, a breach of fiduciary duty, a breach of the Operating Agreement,
or some combination of these factors.
121.
For this variable, six agreements did not provide the relevant information and
7.8% of the agreements contained indemnification provisions that covered other parties.
122.
In addition, the Operating Agreement is more likely to require the unanimous
consent of members to amend the agreement when the Operating Agreement modifies or
eliminates members’ duty of loyalty than when it does not (p=.049). Specifically, the
unanimous consent of members is required in 48.9% of the agreements modifying or
eliminating members’ duty of loyalty and 29.4% of the agreements not including such a
modification or elimination.
123.
In addition, the Operating Agreement is more likely to require the consent of
certain managers to amend the agreement when the Operating Agreement modifies or
eliminates managers’ duty of loyalty (p=.002) or personal liability (p=.027) than when it
does not.
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Figure 8. Target of Indemnification by Limitation or Elimination of Member
Duty of Loyalty
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Figure 9. Target of Indemnification by Limitation or Elimination of Manager
Duty of Loyalty
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3. Self-Dealing and Third-Party Governance Rights
As noted above, a majority of the database Operating Agreements
modified or purported to eliminate the duty of loyalty of members and managers.
In addition, a majority of the agreements expressly permitted members to compete
with the LLC or other members. These types of modifications might be expected
given the language of some LLC statutes that permit modifications of the duty of
loyalty that are not manifestly unreasonable.124 Several courts also have recognized
124.

See supra Part I.A.2.
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the ability of members to eliminate anti-competition provisions in modifying the
duty of loyalty in appropriate cases. 125
Some of the database Operating Agreements, however, further extended
modifications of the duty of loyalty by expressly permitting self-dealing conduct.
These provisions typically recognized the ability of members or managers to
consider their own interests or the interests of certain identified parties in
managing the affairs of the LLC. For example, the Operating Agreement might
provide: “[E]ach Member will be entitled to consider only such factors and
interests as it desires, including its own interests, and shall have no duty or
obligation to give any consideration to any interest of or factors affecting the
Company or any other Person.”126
The language and scope of these self-dealing provisions varied among the
Operating Agreements. Nevertheless, 40.3% of the Operating Agreements
included some variation that gave the members or managers the discretion to
consider their own interests or other specified interests in lieu of the best interests
of the LLC or other members. Moreover, 13.2% of the Operating Agreements not
only gave members or managers such discretion, but also directed that their votes
be cast in a specified manner.
In addition, the more questionable category of self-dealing provisions that
directed members or managers to consider their own interests or the interests of
others as paramount were associated with Operating Agreements that gave
identified third-parties some form of limited governance rights. For example, the
Operating Agreement might give a lender or other third party veto or consent
rights with respect to certain aspects of the LLC’s affairs.127 Operating Agreements
granting these third-party governance rights were significantly more likely than
agreements not granting these rights to identify specific factors to be considered by
members or managers in managing the LLC (33.3% versus 11.2%, respectively;
p=.032) (see Figure 10). These LLCs also were significantly more likely than those
125.
See, e.g., Vila v. BVWebTies LLC, C.A. No. 4308-VCS, 2010 WL 3866098,
at *12 (Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2010) (explaining that a breach of fiduciary duty counterclaim was
lacking merit because “the LLC Agreement explicitly allowed [member] to engage in other
business activities” and was “an improper attempt to supplant the primacy of the LLC
Agreement in the alternative entity context”); Pointer v. Castellani, 918 N.E.2d 805, 819
(Mass. 2009) (affirming that president-member was not liable for breach of fiduciary duty
of loyalty by usurping a corporate opportunity because “operating agreement directly
enumerat[ed] a limited business purpose and explicitly allow[ed] any member the right ‘to
conduct any other business or activity whatsoever’” (citations omitted)).
126.
OPERATING AGREEMENT OF ATLAS PIPELINE MID-CONTINENT WESTOK, LLC
at 40 § 6.4 (July 27, 2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1092914/
000119312507165488/dex105.htm.
127.
The database included only a small number of these agreements, with 9.3%
of the Operating Agreements granting some type of third-party governance rights.
Accordingly, the statistical significance of these associations may be affected by the small
sample size. If a third-party received governance rights under the Operating Agreement, it
also was significantly more likely to have access to the LLC’s confidential information than
third-parties without such governance rights (p=.049).
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not granting third-party governance rights to be structured as a single-purpose or
special-purpose vehicle (p<.001).
Figure 10. Direction to Consider Other Interests by Granting Third-Party
Governance Rights
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4. Transferability and Exit Rights
The law treats LLC membership interests similar to partnership interests.
Accordingly, LLC membership interests generally are not transferable without the
consent of the other members.128 LLC members often can transfer their economic
interests but not their non-economic interests (typically akin to their control rights)
in the LLC.129 This feature reflects the close relationship that typically exists
among members to an LLC: Members want some control over the parties involved
with the business. It also may make financing and growth challenging, depending
on the LLC’s objectives.
Despite the potential downside, the majority (81.4%) of database
Operating Agreements included general restrictions on the transfer of membership
interests.130 Only 10.1% of the agreements permitted free transferability, and 4.7%
allowed free transferability after compliance with a formal notice procedure. The
lack of a meaningful exit strategy for members raises concerns regarding potential
minority oppression, particularly under Operating Agreements that also modify or
eliminate one or more traditional fiduciary duties.
Minority oppression—or “squeeze-out” or “freeze-out”—commonly is
defined as oppressive conduct in a business enterprise by controlling
128.
J. WILLIAM CALLISON & MAUREEN A. SULLIVAN, LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANIES: A STATE-BY-STATE GUIDE TO LAW AND PRACTICE § 4:4 (2012)
129.
Id.
130.
In addition, 3.1% of the database Operating Agreements included not only a
general restriction on transfer but also a prohibition on transferring the membership interest
to a competitor or person affiliated with a competitor of the LLC. For this variable, one
agreement did not provide the relevant information.
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stakeholders.131 Similar to shareholders in closely held corporations, the lack of a
robust secondary market and the presence of transferability restrictions may
expose LLC members to oppression. Commentators have thoughtfully explored
the consequences of oppression, which may include exclusion from profits or
economic gain, denial of business information, exclusion from decision-making,
termination of employment or removal from management, and limitations on exit
or withdrawal.132 The discussion of minority oppression in the LLC context also
must consider whether the risk exposure inherent in accepting a minority or
passive interest in an LLC was priced into or negotiated as part of the parties’ ex
ante bargain.
To inform this discussion, coders analyzed any buy-out provisions or
rights of first refusal included in the database Operating Agreements. Buy-out
agreements create an opportunity for minority holders and other members to
change the composition of the LLC ownership structure when, for example, the
parties’ objectives have changed or a member breaches the agreement. Likewise,
rights of first refusal facilitate membership changes by allowing parties to exit
after first offering their interests to the LLC or other members.133
Only 16 of the database Operating Agreements included some form of a
buy-out provision. All of the buy-out provisions were permissive in nature,
allowing the company or non-defaulting members to purchase other members’
interests at a fair or predetermined price. The buy-out provisions were triggered by
a variety of factors, including the default of a member, failure of a member to

131.
See 1 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S
OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 1:1 (2012) (“[T]he term
‘squeeze-out’ [means] the use by some of the owners or participants in a business enterprise
of strategic position, inside information, or powers of control, or the utilization of some
legal device or technique, to eliminate from the enterprise one or more of its owners or
participants.”).
132.
See, e.g., id. § 1:3; Miller, Remedies, supra note 90, at 416 (criticizing the
“movement to eliminate buy-out rights of limited liability company members in order to
achieve estate tax-related objectives”); Moll, supra note 17 (arguing that the problems of
minority oppression in the close corporation setting are applicable to the limited liability
company form of business organization).
133.
See, e.g., 1 O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 131 § 6:16 (“Properly drawn
[buy-out provisions or rights of first refusal] can be a protection against squeeze
out[s] . . . .”); Miller, Remedies, supra note 90, at 454 (arguing that “[c]onsidering the
relative imbalance of power between majority and minority LLC owners, and the uncertain
prospects for litigation concerning a breach of fiduciary duty and duty of care, LLC statutes
should retain a default buy-out rule to protect minority LLC owners who may have lacked
the bargaining power or the foresight to obtain reasonable buy-out protection in an
operating agreement”); Moll, supra note 17, at 896 (“Exit rights for the owners of any
business enterprise are useful in two major respects. First, an exit allows an owner to
liquidate its investment and to recover the value of its invested capital. Second, the threat of
exit in large numbers tends to restrain managers from taking action that harms the interests
of owners.”).
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comply with transfer restrictions on the interests, deadlock among the parties, and
the bankruptcy or death of a member or similar change in control feature.134
Some of the database Operating Agreements also included mandatory
rights of first refusal.135 These rights were allocated to either the company, the
company and some or all of the other members, all of the other members, or
specified members. In most agreements (97%), the right of first refusal provision
was only one of several restrictions on transfer.
The data did not show any significant association among the modification
of either members’ or managers’ fiduciary duties and either buy-out agreements or
rights of first refusal. Nevertheless, a significant association did emerge between
provisions eliminating the personal liability of managers and buy-out provisions.
Specifically, Operating Agreements were significantly more likely to limit or
eliminate the personal liability of managers to the LLC, members, or other
beneficiaries when the agreements did not include a buy-out provision (73.2%
versus 33.3%, respectively; p=.002) (see Figure 11). In addition, 77 (59.7%) of the
Operating Agreements included in this analysis identified one or more members as
managers.136
Figure 11. Limitation or Elimination of Personal Liability of Managers to
Others by Existence of Buy-Out Provision
100.0%
73.2%

80.0%

66.7%

60.0%
40.0%

33.3%
26.8%

20.0%
0.0%
Provision
Limita tion or Elimina tion

No Provision
No Limita tion or Elimina tion

134.
Of the 16 Operating Agreements with buy-out provisions, five granted rights
to members upon another member attempting to transfer interests in violation of the
agreement; four were triggered by another member’s default under the agreement; one was
based on deadlock among members; one was based on financial insolvency of another
member; and five were some combination of factors.
135.
Thirty-three (25.6%) of the Operating Agreements included rights of first
refusal. All of these rights were mandatory in nature. Approximately half (n=16) of the
rights of first refusal were granted to the LLC and other members, with the majority of
remaining (n=12) rights being granted just to the other members.
136.
As described in Part II.B.2.a–b, these data include members with
management responsibilities in both member-managed and manager-managed LLCs.
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The association between managers’ personal liability and buy-out
provisions—similar to that between managers’ personal liability and
indemnification—requires further analysis.137 One conceivable explanation is that
members are less concerned about minority oppression issues in the context of
managers versus members and, accordingly, less likely to negotiate over buy-out
provisions or indemnification.138 If the LLC employs a completely independent,
third-party manager, that explanation might ease concerns. Nevertheless, many
managers also are members. Notably, 92.2% of the Operating Agreements with
members acting as managers do not include buy-out provisions.139 The
implications of these data are considered further below in the context of specific
database Operating Agreements.
C. Synthesizing the Data and Findings
The data provide several meaningful insights into the LLC organization
process among a population that is likely to critically analyze and negotiate the
terms of an Operating Agreement.140 The data show that these parties frequently
modify the duty of loyalty and preserve members’ ability to operate other ventures
and compete with the LLC but do not necessarily invoke blanket waivers of
fiduciary duties or personal liability. Some of the data, however, raise interesting
issues about the extent of duty waivers and the allocation of power at the
negotiating table. Although it is difficult to perform a quantitative analysis of these
issues using the data, the language of the Operating Agreements and the
associations in the data permit several meaningful inferences. This section
explores these inferences and builds the foundation for the application of trust
theory to LLC law discussed in Part III.
1. The Language of the Agreements
The Authors reviewed each of the 150 database Operating Agreements in
detail. This Article does not seek to perform a contextual analysis of each
agreement; rather, it summarizes certain common governance provisions that
contribute to the overall analysis. This Subsection highlights provisions from
Operating Agreements that represent member-managed, manager-managed, and
third-party governance situations and supplements these examples with related
provisions from other database Operating Agreements.

137.
See infra Part II.C.2.
138.
The Authors acknowledge that the parties also might negotiate a separate
Buy-Out Agreement that is not incorporated into the Operating Agreement. The data do not
capture any separate, independent agreements.
139.
A significant trend emerged showing an association between Operating
Agreements with members acting as managers and the absence of buy-out provisions
(p=.053).
140.
See supra Part II.B.1.
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a. Member-Managed LLCs
The governance structures used in member-managed LLCs ranged from
all members having some control over management decisions to only one or a few
members being designated as managers. Although the latter structure appeared
more frequently among the member-managed database Operating Agreements
(68.3%), the remaining member-managed database Operating Agreements (31.7%)
contemplated a management role for all members. The Operating Agreements
often implemented an all-member management structure through a board or
committee of managers: Each member appoints one or an equal number of
representatives to the board and maintains some control over those representatives.
In addition, the Operating Agreements specifically recognized the control over,
and relationship between, the member and the member’s appointee.
Hybrid member-managed LLCs frequently invoke both a centralizedmanagement feature and a member-specific allocation of management rights and
duties. For example, Laurel Mountain Midstream, LLC (“Laurel Mountain”), is a
joint venture between a subsidiary of the Williams Company, Inc., and Atlas
Pipeline Partners, L.P., that owns and operates a significant natural gas gathering
system active in the Marcellus Shale in western Pennsylvania. 141 The Operating
Agreement generally provides:
The business and affairs of the Company shall be managed under
the direction of the Members acting through the Management
Committee, subject to (a) the delegation of powers and duties to the
Operating Member pursuant to Article 7 and to officers of the
Company and other Persons as provided for by resolution of the
Management Committee and (b) the special rights of the Preferred
Interest Member set forth in Section 5.8.142

To retain the desired level of member control, each member of Laurel
Mountain appoints one representative and one alternate representative to the
Management Committee.143 A majority vote of representatives on the Management
Committee is sufficient to conduct most business, with certain events triggering a
different percentage vote.144 The Laurel Mountain Operating Agreement uses this
committee structure in lieu of authorizing each member to act as an agent for the
LLC, which is the default rule under many LLC statutes. 145 On this point, the
agreement provides: “No Member, solely by reason of its status as such, has any
right to transact any business for the Company or any authority or power to sign

141.
Laurel Mountain Midstream LLC, WIKIMARCELLUS, http://waytogoto.com/
wiki/index.php/Laurel_Mountain_Midstream_LLC (last visited Sept. 21, 2012).
142.
AMENDED AND RESTATED LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AGREEMENT OF
LAUREL MOUNTAIN MIDSTREAM, LLC § 5.1, at 29 (June 1, 2009) [hereinafter LAUREL
MOUNTAIN] (emphasis removed), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
1092914/000119312509126234/dex102.htm.
143.
Id. § 5.2, at 29.
144.
Id. § 5.4, at 29–30.
145.
See id. § 5.1, at 29.
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for or bind the Company unless such power or authority has been expressly
delegated to such Member in accordance with this Agreement . . . .”146
In a corporate setting, this type of committee structure typically weakens
owners’ oversight and control because, among other things, directors must exercise
their fiduciary duties for the benefit of the corporation and shareholders generally.
The Laurel Mountain Operating Agreement, among others, alters this outcome by
contract. Specifically, it states:
(a) Each Member acknowledges its express intent, and
agrees with the other Member, for the benefit of the
Representatives, that to the fullest extent permitted by applicable
Law: (i) the only fiduciary or other duties or obligations, if any, that
any Representative will owe in their capacity as a Representative
will be to the Member that appointed such Representative to serve
in that capacity, and the nature and extent of those duties and
obligations and the liabilities resulting from any breach thereof
constitute an internal governance affair of Member; and (ii) no
Representative will, under this Agreement, the Delaware Act or
otherwise, owe in his capacity as a Representative, or be personally
liable for monetary damages for any breach of, any fiduciary or
other duties or obligations, including any obligation of good faith
and fair dealing, to the Company, any other Member or any of their
respective Affiliates or any other Representative.147

Nevertheless, the Operating Agreement does impose some traditional fiduciary
duties on the one member identified as the “Operating Member.”148
In addition, the Laurel Mountain Operating Agreement includes detailed
provisions that permit members to compete with the business of the LLC and other
members, subject to identified projects committed to the LLC itself. 149 It also
146.
147.
148.

Id. § 5.7, at 31.
Id. § 6.5, at 33.
Id. § 7.4, at 37.
The Operating Member shall exercise the Operating Member’s powers
and rights, and discharge the Operating Member’s duties under this
Agreement in accordance with the following: (a) the requirements of this
Agreement; (b) in accordance with practices generally acceptable for an
experienced and prudent operator engaged in a similar activity under
similar circumstances of the natural gas gathering industry; (c) all
applicable Laws and regulations, including environmental standards in
effect from time to time, and any other applicable rules and requirements
of Governmental Authorities; (d) the contractual obligations and
undertakings of the Company, as the same may be amended from time to
time; and (e) honestly, in good faith and in the reasonable interests of the
Company . . . .

149.

Id. § 2.8, at 17.
Except as otherwise provided in this Section . . . with respect to the Area
of Interest, the Members and their Affiliates may at any time, and from
time to time, directly or indirectly, engage in, and possess interests in,

Id.
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includes a broad exculpation of member liability for any alleged usurpations of
LLC opportunities:
[N]o Member who (directly or though [sic] an Affiliate) acquires
knowledge of a potential transaction, agreement, arrangement or
other matter that may be an opportunity for the Member shall have
any duty to communicate or offer such opportunity to the Company,
and such Member (and its officers and Representatives on the
Management Committee) shall not be liable to the Company, any
Member or any other Person for breach of any fiduciary or other
duty by reason of the fact that such Member pursues or acquires
such opportunity for itself or its Affiliate, directs such opportunity
to another Person or does not communicate such opportunity or
information to the Company. 150

Modifications of members’ duty of loyalty and exculpation of members’
personal liability to the LLC, members, or other beneficiaries were common
provisions in member-managed Operating Agreements. Many were tailored to the
circumstances of the parties’ particular deal, as in Laurel Mountain. Others,
however, contained much broader language. 151 In addition, several membermanaged Operating Agreements—with only one or a few members granted
management authority—included broad purported waivers of fiduciary duties of
those managers.152
without the consent of the Company or the other Member, other business
ventures and activities of any and every type and description,
independently or with others, regardless of whether such ventures are
competitive with the Company or any other Member, and regardless of
whether such business ventures and activities are located inside or
outside the Area of Interest, or otherwise.
Id.
150.
Id.
151.
For example, the Mt. Hamilton Operating Agreement, which is managed in
part by a member-appointed management committee, provides:
There are no implied covenants contained in this Agreement other than
the contractual duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Members, the
Manager and the Representatives shall not have any fiduciary or other
duties to the Company or the other Members except as specifically
provided by this Agreement, and the Members’, the Representatives’,
and the Manager’s duties and liabilities otherwise existing at law or in
equity are restricted and eliminated by the provisions of this Agreement
to those duties and liabilities specifically set forth in this Agreement.
MT. HAMILTON, supra note 118, § 4.10, at 20. The Mt. Hamilton Operating Agreement
allocates certain management responsibilities to one member but reserves “major decisions”
to the management committee as direct member control. See id. § 5.2(a), at 21
(“Representatives shall not be considered managers under the Act, but derive all of their
right, power and authority from the Members.”).
152.
See, e.g., NATIONAL CINEMEDIA, LLC THIRD AMENDED AND RESTATED
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY OPERATING AGREEMENT § 4.14, at 31 (Feb. 13, 2007),
available
at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1377630/000119312507034062/
dex101.htm (“[W]henever in this Agreement a Manager . . . is permitted or required to
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b. Manager-Managed LLCs
Manager-managed LLCs in the database Operating Agreements ranged
from companies with only independent third-party managers to third-party
managers appointed by or affiliated with members to combinations of both
structures. In some cases, members retained voting or veto rights over specified
actions or amendments to the agreements. In others, managers retained complete
discretion over most decisions, and are subject only to removal for cause. As noted
above, strong manager liability protections did not always correlate with strong
member protections.153
NC2 Global, LLC (“NC2 Global”), is a joint venture between Caterpillar,
Inc., and Navistar, Inc., that “combines truck manufacturing and transportation
expertise with worldwide distribution.”154 The NC2 Global Operating Agreement is
a manager-managed structure that expressly acknowledges that, subject to certain
exceptions, “the Members shall not have any vote or take any part in the control or
management of the Business or have any authority or power to act for or on behalf
of the Company in any manner whatsoever.”155 Rather, similar to the Laurel
Mountain Operating Agreement, each member of NC2 Global is entitled to appoint
four representatives to the board. One distinction between the two structures,
however, is that the NC2 Global members’ representatives may not be “an officer
or employee of the Company or an employee of [the member] or one of its
Affiliates who is seconded to the Company . . . .”156
Interestingly, the lack of formal affiliation between a member and its
representative in a manager-managed LLC may not be a meaningful distinction in
every case. For example, similar to the Laurel Mountain Operating Agreement, the
NC2 Global Operating Agreement also limits the fiduciary duties of the board of
representatives, stating: “No Representatives shall owe a fiduciary duty to the
Company or to a Member not appointing such Representative, except for the
make a decision . . . in its ‘sole discretion’ or ‘discretion,’ with ‘complete discretion’ or
under a grant of similar authority or latitude, such Manager . . . shall be entitled to consider
only such interests and factors as it desires, including its own interests, and shall, to the
fullest extent permitted by applicable law, have no duty or obligation to give any
consideration to any interest of or factors affecting the Company or the Members . . . .”);
LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AGREEMENT OF RIDGEWOOD ENERGY K FUND, LLC § 12.11, at
A-30 (April 1, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1285480/
000121465905001256/ex101.txt (“There are potential conflicts of interest involved in the
operation of the Fund. . . . In determining a course of action or deciding among various
alternatives that potentially conflict, the Manager will consider these and other conflicts that
may exist and exercise reasonable business judgment when determining such action or
choosing among various alternatives.”).
153.
See supra Part II.B.
154.
Who We Are, NC2,, http://www.nc2.com/overview (last visited Sept. 28,
2012).
155.
AMENDED AND RESTATED JOINT VENTURE OPERATING AGREEMENT § 4.1
(Sept. 9, 2009) [hereinafter NC2 GLOBAL], available at http://www.sec.gov//
edgar/data/18230/000001823009000375/ex_10-1.htm.
156.
Id. § 5.1.
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implied contractual covenant of good faith and fair dealing provided for under the
[Delaware] Act.”157 In addition, the NC2 Global Operating Agreement requires
unanimous member consent for a variety of conduct, such as admission of new
members, changes to board composition, and amendments of the Operating
Agreement.158 These member-retained voting rights coupled with the directed
duties owed by board representatives give members significant control even in this
type of manager-managed structure.
The NC2 Global Operating Agreement does not specifically address
members’ fiduciary duties or exculpation of members’ liability, other than through
an extremely detailed covenant not to compete and limited indemnification
provisions. As discussed above, many courts interpret silence as preserving
traditional fiduciary duties for managers and controlling members. 159 Accordingly,
unless addressed in a separate agreement, members in an LLC like NC2 Global
may continue to owe certain fiduciary duties. This conclusion likely is supported
by the limitation of liability provision included in the NC2 Global Operating
Agreement. That provision invokes traditional notions of owners’ limited liability
for a company’s debt and provides that owners are not liable for that debt solely by
reason of being a member of an LLC. 160

157.
Id. § 5.12.
158.
Id. § 4.8 (listing a number of actions or decisions requiring unanimous
member consent).
159.
See, e.g., In re CLK Energy Partners, LLC, Bankruptcy No. 09-50616, 2010
WL 1930065, at *8 (Bankr. W.D. La. May 12, 2010) (“Delaware’s LLC Act provides that
an LLC agreement may modify or even eliminate the fiduciary duties of an LLC’s
managers. The only duty that cannot be eliminated is the duty of good faith and fair dealing.
If the LLC agreement is silent as to those duties, Delaware courts will generally default to
the fiduciary duties applicable to a corporation. Accordingly, the scope of a manager’s
duties in the LLC context turns on the applicable LLC agreement.” (citations omitted));
Coventry Real Estate Advisors, L.L.C. v. Developers Diversified Realty Corp., 923
N.Y.S.2d 476, 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (“Under Delaware law . . . , absent a provision to
the contrary in the governing LLC agreement, an LLC’s ‘managers and controlling
members owe the traditional fiduciary duties that directors and controlling shareholders in a
corporation would . . . .’” (citations omitted)); Kelly v. Blum, Civil Action No. 4516-VCP,
2010 WL 629850, at *10–14 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2010).
160.
NC2 GLOBAL, supra note 155, § 4.2.
No Member shall be obligated or liable to the Company, any creditor of
the Company, or any other Person, for any Liabilities or debts of the
Company, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, solely by
reason of being a Member, except as specifically set forth herein or as
otherwise agreed to in writing by such Member. Except as required by
law, no Member shall be liable to the Company, any other Member, any
creditor of the Company, or any other Person for the repayment of
amounts received from the Company. The failure of the Company to
observe any formalities or requirements relating to the exercise of its
powers or management of its Business or affairs under this Agreement or
the Act shall not be grounds for imposing personal liability on the
Members or the Representatives for Liabilities or debts of the Company,
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The majority of manager-managed Operating Agreements contained
waivers of managers’ duties and limitations of managers’ personal liability. These
agreements included manager-managed structures that did not directly link a
manager’s duties to the member appointing or hiring the manager. For example, in
Raft River Energy, LLC (“Raft River”), which is essentially a financing
arrangement between U.S. Geothermal, Inc., and The Goldman Sachs Group for
owning and operating a geothermal energy plant in Idaho, the members are entitled
to vote for members of the management committee in a more traditional
owner/shareholder format.161 The Raft River Operating Agreement does not direct
managers to vote in a particular manner, but it does contain very broad exculpation
provisions for both managers and members:
Notwithstanding any provision to the contrary elsewhere
in this agreement, to the extent that, at law or in equity, the
Management Committee or any member has any duties (fiduciary or
otherwise) and liabilities relating thereto to the company or another
member of the company, (A) neither the management committee
nor any member shall be liable to the company or the other
members for actions taken by the management committee, any
member or any of their affiliates in reliance upon the provisions of
this agreement, (B) each manager is expressly permitted to serve as
a manager or director of any other entity, including other entities in
the same or similar industries, (C) each member and each manager
is permitted to explore and develop business opportunities outside
of the company, even if such opportunities may compete with the
activities of the company, (D) no manager or member is required,
by virtue of their position as a manager or member, to present
business opportunities in the geothermal industry or utilizing
geothermal resources to the management committee or the company
before pursuing such opportunities in any capacity or on behalf of
any other entity, and (E) the duties (fiduciary or otherwise) of the
management committee, each manager and each member are
intended to be modified and limited to those expressly set forth in
this agreement, and no implied covenants, functions,
responsibilities, duties, obligations or liabilities shall be read into

whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, solely by reason of being a
Member or Representative.
Id.
161.
The Raft River Operating Agreement allocates members’ voting rights for
the management committee based on units held by the member and the financing nature of
the agreement—e.g., in the first year, the financing member is allocated more seats on the
committee than it receives in the second year, and so forth. AMENDED AND RESTATED
OPERATING AGREEMENT OF RAFT RIVER ENERGY I LLC § 5.2 (Aug. 9, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1172136/000106299306002569/exhibit10-2.htm.
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this agreement, or otherwise exist against the management
committee or any member.162

Nevertheless, some member-managed and manager-managed Operating
Agreements—including the single-purpose entities discussed below—do recognize
basic fiduciary duties for managers and often reconcile any exculpation provisions
with the scope of those duties.163
c. Third-Party Governance Rights in Operating Agreements
The majority of database Operating Agreements allocated management
and control rights solely to members and managers. Nevertheless, a handful of
agreements also granted some type of governance right—e.g., a vote, consent, or
veto right—to non-members and non-managers. These third-party governance
rights typically were associated with financing arrangements underlying the
formation and operations of the LLC and frequently were coupled with access to
information rights.164
It is possible for an LLC to have a provision in their Operating
Agreement that requires lenders to consent to some LLC actions. For example,
G&E HC REIT II Pocatello MOB JV, LLC (“G&E”), is an LLC formed by Grubb
& Ellis Healthcare REIT II Holdings, LP, and Pocatello Medical Office Partners,
LLC, for purposes of certain real estate development activities. 165 Article X of the
G&E Operating Agreement identifies the LLC as a “single purpose entity” and
requires the lender’s consent to a variety of actions relating to the LLC’s
operations.166 These actions include: amendments to the agreement; any
liquidation, dissolution, or similar transaction involving the LLC; and any changes
to the LLC’s business model.167

162.
Id. § 5.14 (original in all caps). Similarly, the Ruby Newco LLC Operating
Agreement, which permits election of managers to a board by a majority vote of the
combined class A and class B units, provides:
Neither Ruby nor any of its Affiliates (other than the Company and the
Company Subsidiaries), nor any of their respective officers, directors
and/or employees shall have any duty to refrain from engaging, directly
or indirectly, in the same or similar business activities or lines of
business as the Company or the Company Subsidiaries.
FORM OF AMENDED AND RESTATED OPERATING AGREEMENT OF RUBY NEWCO LLC § 4.8(b),
at D-13 (2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1308161/
000119312507197546/ds4.htm.
163.
See infra Part II.C.1.c.
164.
Operating Agreements granting third-party governance rights were
significantly more likely to organize as a single purpose or special purpose entity (p<.001)
and to receive access to information (p=.049).
165.
See AMENDED AND RESTATED LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY AGREEMENT OF
G&E HC REIT I POCATELLO MOB JV, LLC § 2.5 (July 27, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1455271/000129993310002918/exhibit2.htm.
166.
Id. § 10.2.
167.
Id. § 10.2(a).
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In addition, Operating Agreements implementing a financing
arrangement—particularly where one or more lenders are not members—recognize
some form of traditional fiduciary duties for managers. For example, the G&E
Operating Agreement states: “The Manager shall discharge its duties in good faith
and in the best interests of the Company in accordance with this Agreement.”168
Similarly, these agreements might align any exculpation of manager liability with
traditional fiduciary duties, such as:
The Managing Member shall not be liable to the LLC or to the
Members for any act performed or omitted to be performed by it on
behalf of the LLC, provided such act or omission was taken in good
faith, was reasonably believed by the Managing Member to be in the
interests of the LLC and within the scope of authority granted or
reserved to the Managing Member under this Agreement, and did
not constitute fraud or willful misconduct.169

Regardless of form, Operating Agreements incorporating third-party
governance rights typically contained at least a basic level of accountability for
members or managers. This observation corresponds with the regression analysis
that shows a significant association between third-party governance rights and
provisions limiting the discretion of members and managers. 170 Next, this Article
will discuss additional associations among contractual provisions and data.
2. Analyzing the Data in Context
The database Operating Agreements are substantively rich and diverse.
Despite the manifest variations, however, several common themes emerge. LLCs
that foster joint ventures between parties in the same or similar industries include
duty waivers frequently tailored to the parties’ relationship or industry. LLCs
managed by one or more members generally include strong manager protections.
Generally, Operating Agreements tend to favor waivers of the duty of loyalty for
both members and managers that permit those parties to compete with or take
opportunities from the LLC. And perhaps not surprisingly, LLCs used as financing
vehicles grant strong protections to third-parties and restrain managers’ discretion
in various respects.171
The contractual language also enhances the quantitative data analysis. For
example, regression analysis suggests a significant association among
modifications to members’ duty of loyalty and a requirement of unanimous
member consent to amend the Operating Agreement. 172 It also suggests a
significant association between elimination of members’ personal liability to the
168.
Id. § 4.1(b).
169.
AMENDED AND RESTATED OPERATING AGREEMENT OF 919 JV LLC, § 7.01(c),
at 34 (Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/
930548/000090514802000032/efc2-0004_ex101.txt.
170.
See supra Part II.B.3.
171.
Operating Agreements with third-party governance rights were significantly
more likely to direct interests to be considered by members or managers (p=.032).
172.
See supra note 122.
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LLC, members, or other beneficiaries and indemnification for members and their
affiliates.173 These associations suggest active negotiation by members who have
built in some voting control and economic protection.
This type of active negotiation is reflected in the Laurel Mountain
Operating Agreement. Consistent with its detailed waivers of liability and
indemnification, the agreement also requires the unanimous consent of members to
amend the agreement and provides specific consequences for a member who
defaults under the agreement, including a forfeiture provision. 174 The Mt. Hamilton
Operating Agreement likewise requires unanimous consent for all but certain
identified amendments and incorporates a separate standard of liability and limited
exculpation for the member who is allocated additional management rights under
the agreement.175 The ability to preserve the contract as negotiated ex ante without
expressed consent gives parties some control over contractual abuses of their
interests in the LLC. It also encourages discussion among members about new or
unanticipated developments. Admittedly, it does not protect members from
breaches of the contract, but they at least have some continuing control over what
does or should constitute a breach.
Several of the database Operating Agreements also reflect meaningful
manager protections. For example, regression analysis shows significant
associations between modifications of managers’ duty of loyalty and various
provisions, including limited personal liability, required consent for amendments
to the Operating Agreement, and indemnification of managers and their
affiliates.176 In addition, the data show a significant trend between modifications to
managers’ duty of loyalty and very broad indemnification provisions covering any
and all claims or liability.177
These associations among waivers of managers’ duty of loyalty and other
manager protections like indemnification and veto rights over amendments
indicate that managers may hold substantial leverage in negotiating the Operating
Agreements. They also suggest that managers may have extremely broad
discretion in operating the LLC and very little accountability to members or the
LLC. This inference must be considered in light of the significant association
between elimination of managers’ personal liability and the absence of buy-out
rights,178 and the large number of members serving as managers in these cases.

173.
See supra Part II.B.2.c.
174.
LAUREL MOUNTAIN, supra note 142, §§ 6.1–6.5, at 32–33 (liability and
indemnification); id. § 13.2, at 53 (amendment); id. § 9.2(a), at 43 (default and forfeiture of
rights).
175.
MT. HAMILTON, supra note 118, § 12.6, at 45–46 (amendment); id. § 5.5, at
26 (exculpation).
176.
See supra Part II.B.2.c.
177.
Operating Agreements are more likely to modify or eliminate managers’
duty of loyalty when “any and all liability” is indemnified than when indemnification is
limited to “actual litigation or proceedings only” (p=.053). See supra Part II.B.2.c.
178.
See supra Part II.B.4.
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Although broad waivers of managers’ duties and personal liability
certainly can be considered and included in the risk allocation desired by the
parties, they also may reflect overreaching by one or more parties, particularly
when the manager is affiliated with one or more members. The challenge for
policymakers in this context is two-fold. The first consideration is whether to
condone bargained-for “overreaching.” The second is whether instances of
overreaching and unequal or no bargaining among affected parties can or should
be controlled. Similarly, related considerations exist as to the scope of permissible
waivers and limitations and whether, as in the Laurel Mountain Operating
Agreements, contractual provisions can protect members from liability to
“persons” other than parties to the Operating Agreement. 179
Overall, the data and contextual analysis suggest that the assumptions (for
example, that LLCs are organized by represented, sophisticated, and fully
informed parties) underlying the purported value of LLCs might prove accurate in
some instances.180 In other instances, however, these assumptions are weak or
inapplicable. The question then becomes how policymakers should allocate
discretion to contract around governance default rules given the variance in the
knowledge and sophistication of parties who are eligible to organize LLCs. Part III
considers this question and proposes some factors for policymakers to balance in
creating any bright-line rules.

III. USING THE DATA IN CONJUNCTION WITH TRUST THEORY TO
STRIKE AN APPROPRIATE POLICY BALANCE
The database of Operating Agreements reflect a spectrum of possibilities.
The data suggest that parties can and do negotiate contract provisions tailored to
their specific needs and risk tolerance. Even in what appear to be heavily
negotiated contracts (based on deal terms and contract length), however, regression
analysis shows that parties with management functions often had more bargaining
power in the negotiation and often tipped the scales in their favor. Consequently,
depending on the parties’ relationship and ex ante bargain, non-managing
members may be significantly disadvantaged in efforts to protect their own
interests. That potential and the issues highlighted by Miller’s empirical surveys181
cannot be overlooked in assessing LLC governance policy and regulation.
This Part draws on trust theory to further explore the potential
implications of the OA Study and prior LLC literature. It not only considers the
foundations of trust—i.e., affective or cognitive—and related behavioral studies,
but it also explores the growing interdisciplinary dialogue regarding trust and
regulation. This dialogue involves both whether law can foster individual trust and
whether trust can guide the need for and scope of any particular regulation. The
179.
The Laurel Mountain Operating Agreement defines “person” as “any
individual, corporation, partnership, joint venture, association, joint stock company, limited
liability company, trust, estate, unincorporated organization or Governmental Authority.”
LAUREL MOUNTAIN, supra note 142, § 1.1, at 12.
180.
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
181.
See supra notes 92–95 and accompanying text.
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application of trust theory to LLC formation enriches the analysis of LLC
governance policy and regulation.
A. An Overview of Trust Theory
Concepts of trust permeate individuals’ personal and economic decisions
on a daily basis.182 Many of these decisions involve an assessment of the
individual’s exposure or vulnerability to risk, and trust often plays a critical role in
whether the individual accepts or rejects potential risk. 183 The type of trust invoked
by an individual may differ, however, depending on the nature of the decision at
hand. Accordingly, a basic understanding of trust concepts is necessary to consider
the utility of trust theory in formulating law.
1. Affective and Cognitive Trust
The term “trust” means different things to different people. Some
commentators focus on the truster’s vulnerability in the trust relationship.184 Others
focus on a mutual trust among parties to the relationship built on shared “values,
principles, and standards of behavior.”185 Still others emphasize the relationship
between trust “and one’s perception of another’s trustworthiness.”186 No one
definition of trust covers all situations, and some level of vulnerability or exposure
(even if just economic exposure) likely underlies all definitions of the term.187
Accordingly, this Article does not adopt one specific definition of trust. Rather, it
focuses on the act of trusting and assumes that the truster undertakes some
assessment of the trustee based on internal or external factors.
This assumption permits an evaluation of the general types of trust—
affective and cognitive—that might inform any regulatory analysis. Affective trust
182.
TAMAR FRANKEL, TRUST AND HONESTY: AMERICA’S BUSINESS CULTURE AT A
CROSSROAD 49–55 (2006).
183.
For a discussion of trust theory and economic decisions generally, see
FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY
(1995) and ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY (2000).
184.
Blair & Stout, supra note 26, at 1739–40 (including as a key component of
trust concept, “a willingness to make oneself vulnerable to another, based on the belief that
the trusted person will choose not to exploit one’s vulnerability”).
185.
Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 557 (2001).
186.
Angela L. Coletti et al., The Effect of Control Systems on Trust and
Cooperation in Collaborative Environments, 80 ACCT. REV. 477, 481 (2005). Notably,
several studies show an association between an individual’s willingness to trust and her own
trustworthiness. See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, Trust in the Shadows: Law, Behavior, and
Financial Re-Regulation, 57 BUFFALO L. REV. 1361, 1379–80 (2009) (explaining study that
“tended to show . . . the extent to which one says one trusts others may, in fact, be a
reflection of that person’s trustworthiness”); Hill & O’Hara, supra note 22, at 1742
(“Because trustworthy people also tend to be more trusting, they are more likely themselves
to seek out opportunities for reaping cooperative gains.”).
187.
See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 24, at 834; Cross, supra note 23, at 1461; Hill
& O’Hara, supra note 22, at 1723–24 (“Despite its importance, scholars from the various
disciplines relevant to trust have failed to converge on a single definition.”).
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is based on emotion and commonly associated with “‘true’ or ‘real’ or ‘moralistic’
trust.”188 Individuals invoking affective trust rarely analyze the potential
consequences of trusting another. Their decision to trust another stems from “an
attitude of optimism about [that person’s] goodwill and . . . the confident
expectation that, when the need arises, the one trusted will be directly and
favorably moved by the thought that [the truster is] counting on her.”189
Cognitive trust is a more calculated approach to the trust decision. “In its
strictest form, cognitive trust is based upon a cost-benefit analysis” of the benefits
of trust versus the associated risks. 190 It is a considered analysis of the potential
advantages and disadvantages to trusting another grounded in relevant information,
risk exposure, and mitigation opportunities. Business and economic decisions are
commonly associated with cognitive trust but, as discussed below, that
generalization does not mean that those decisions are never the result of affective
trust or that other decisions are never the result of cognitive trust.191
To the contrary, many decisions likely include elements of both affective
and cognitive trust.192 In fact, some commentators emphasize the value of
encouraging trust that involves active assessment by the truster of all available
information, including prior experiences that inform emotional assessments of the
trustee (both trusting and distrusting), social norms, and external regulations. 193
This Article refers to this blended type of trust as “informed trust” but recognizes
the various gradations of informed trust that might exist. Admittedly, informed
trust is only as good as the available information and the truster’s assessment
skills. Fully informed but inaccurate assessments may still result.
The limitations of even informed trust decisions have led commentators
to consider when and how trust theory should inform legal regulations. 194
Although some commentators debate the extent to which regulations should try to

188.
See Cross, supra note 23, at 1464–65 (explaining affective trust).
189.
Id. at 1464 (citation omitted).
190.
Id. at 1465.
191.
See Colombo, supra note 24, at 836 (explaining economic foundation often
attributed to cognitive trust and the perspective of some commentators that such an
economic calculation is not trust at all).
192.
See, e.g., Cross, supra note 23, at 1468 (explaining the blending of affective
and cognitive trust and noting that “[a]ffective trust may itself be fundamentally cognitive
and strategic if our trusting nature is the product of experience or hardwired by evolution
into our brains”); see also Brescia, supra note 186, at 1370 (observing that “separating out
each instance where one is applying affective or cognitive trust can be difficult”). The
concept of “authentic trust” blends certain elements of cognitive and affective trust, but it
does not embrace considered analysis or calculation in the trust decision. See, e.g., Cross,
supra note 23, at 1470–71 (describing the concept of authentic trust and its limitations).
193.
See, e.g., Cross, supra note 23, at 1530 (“Optimal trust has been defined as
‘prudence with a bias toward trust’” (citation omitted)); Hill & O’Hara, supra note 22, at
1721 (“We argue that trust is a nuanced cognitive assessment of another’s trustworthiness,
and that it is made using both conscious and subconscious processes.”).
194.
See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 24, at 853–57; Hill & O’Hara, supra note 22,
at 1729–33.
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maximize individual trust, 195 this Article assumes that, at least in the LLC context,
basic default rules are necessary to provide some certainty to parties organizing
LLCs and to those doing business with LLCs. The Article focuses on the role of
trust in creating or refining regulations.
Legal rules typically mandate how people should act and the
consequences of their failure to act.196 As mentioned above, this basic framework
can provide much needed certainty, particularly in the areas of business and
finance. Neither policymakers nor commentators can agree, however, regarding
the optimal level of regulation, with both sides arguing the dire consequences of
either too little or too much regulation. 197 In this regard, some commentators argue
that too much regulation “crowds out” trust-based decisions.198 With most
significant details of a transaction subject to regulation, individuals do not need to
assess the trustworthiness of the trustee or the value of the transaction to them
based on that assessment. Likewise, too little regulation may subject individuals to
significant risk because they may inaccurately assess the trustworthiness of the
trustee.199 The role of policymakers is to strike an appropriate balance between
these two extremes.
2. The Interrelatedness of Trust and Regulation
Relationships built on informed trust generally are more efficient and
durable than pure arm’s-length transactions.200 For example, informed trust

195.
Compare Ribstein, supra note 185, with Tamar Frankel, Trusting and NonTrusting on the Internet, 81 B.U. L. REV. 457 (2001). For a discussion about empirical data
concerning the relation between trust and law, see Cross, supra note 23, at 1523–27.
196.
Indeed, legal rules work primarily by “promising rewards and threatening
punishments,” which may undervalue trust relationships. See Blair & Stout, supra note 26,
at 1739.
197.
See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER HOOD ET AL., THE GOVERNMENT OF RISK:
UNDERSTANDING RISK REGULATION REGIMES (2001); Thomas M. Arnold & Jerry L.
Stevens, Mixed Agendas and Government Regulation of Business: Can We Clean Up the
Mess?, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 1059 (2011).
198.
See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 24, at 850 (explaining “crowd out” theory);
Sim B. Sitkin & Nancy L. Roth, Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic
“Remedies” for Trust/Distrust, 4 ORG. SCI. 367, 369 (1993) (“The adoption of legalistic
‘remedies’ . . . imposes a psychological and/or an interactional barrier between the two
parties that stimulates an escalating spiral of formality and distance and leads to a need for
more rules.” (citations omitted)).
199.
See Blair & Stout, supra note 26, at 1802 (noting, in exploring roles of
interpersonal trust and fiduciary duties, that “[t]rust only works, however, when one knows
that one’s fellow shareholders in the firm are indeed trustworthy”); Hill & O’Hara, supra
note 22, at 1729–33 (describing limitations of trust); see also generally Carol M. Rose,
Trust in the Mirror of Betrayal, 75 B.U. L. REV. 531 (1995) (discussing the role of law in
trust relationships).
200.
See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 26, at 1757 (“Where trust can be
harnessed, it can substantially reduce the inefficiencies associated with both agency and
team production relationships.”).
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relationships can reduce monitoring, implementation, and enforcement costs.201
Not all informed trust relationships, however, produce optimal results in the
absence of regulation. To that end, some commentators posit that legal regulation
is most appropriate “where people are inclined to systematically trust one another
too much or too little and are systematically inclined to process trust information
heuristically.”202 The objective then is to identify circumstances that foster more
accurately informed trust assessments, as well as those that do not.
Prior literature and cooperation studies generally indicate increased levels
of cooperation and trust sentiments when the parties know each other and engage
in repeated dealings.203 Parties who know each other likely share the same values,
friends, or business industry; are personally invested in the transaction; and face
reputational or other retribution for misconduct. 204 If the parties engage in multiple
transactions or a sustained relationship, they may be motivated to continue the
relationship or at least have an opportunity to acquire positive or negative
information concerning the other party to more accurately assess their
trustworthiness.205 In these instances, lower levels of regulation may produce
optimal results.206
On the other hand, increased regulation may be necessary if the parties do
not know each other or if there is a preexisting relationship that biases any trust
assessment.207 In these instances, the parties’ lack of information or inaccurate
assessments cause misguided trust and create potentially significant costs and
201.
See Brescia, supra note 186, at 1372 (“[T]rust reduces transaction costs
because economic actors have to spend less time and money searching for legitimate
economic partners and monitoring the behavior of such partners.”).
202.
Hill & O’Hara, supra note 22, at 1733; see also Colombo, supra note 24, at
875 (arguing for nominal regulation where affective trust is strong and more regulation in
purely cognitive trust settings).
203.
See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 26, at 1760–62 (explaining social
dilemma experiments supporting human tendencies of trust and cooperative behavior);
Brescia, supra note 186, at 1378–89 (describing a study that, among other things, showed
“when the parties did not know one another, it was less likely that they engaged in conduct
likely to optimize the outcome for both”); see also Colombo, supra note 24, at 842–43
(explaining psychology of trust and concept that “[a]ll trust, whatever its originating
wellspring, ‘grows with use’” (quoting Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Importance of Being
Trusted, 81 B.U. L. REV. 591, 600 (2001))).
204.
See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 26, at 1750–55 (explaining incentives
driven by internalized trust); Hill & O’Hara, supra note 22, at 1794 (“[I]ncreased
reputational consequences of lax monitoring [by corporate directors] may . . . be able to do
what law cannot . . . .”).
205.
See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 24, at 842 (explaining the development of
trust over time).
206.
See Hill & O’Hara, supra note 22, at 1749–50 (“To the extent that
relationships are formed and maintained in a manner consistent with this paradigmatic
relationship [e.g., built gradually over time], the role for law in promoting an optimal level
of trust is presumably minimal.”).
207.
See id. at 1734–40 (discussing trust biases and decision-making errors related
to trust).
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unjust results.208 Although the law arguably should not protect individuals from
bad business decisions, a truster’s lack of accurate information may warrant some
regulatory restraints on the trustee’s conduct. Legal regulation substitutes for the
moral or relational restraints otherwise imposed in an informed trust
relationship.209
This broad interplay between trust and regulation informs the LLC
fiduciary debate.210 The contractual nature of the LLC form inherently draws on
the knowledge, experiences, and relationship among the contracting parties. These
characteristics lend themselves nicely to a trust theory analysis, which in turn may
help guide LLC governance regulations.
B. The Role of Trust in LLCs
Parties use the LLC form to support a variety of business endeavors. 211
State law generally does not restrict the identity of members or business purposes
of LLCs.212 As such, no one trust relationship likely describes every LLC. 213
Nevertheless, the informed trust characteristics described above provide a solid
foundation for applying trust theory to LLCs.
LLCs with only a few members who know each other and operate in the
same or related industries present the strongest case for informed trust
relationships.214 The business origins of most of these relationships weaken the
negative trust biases often introduced by familial or friendship ties. Additionally,
the common industry or shared business acquaintances may lend stability to the
208.
See Colombo, supra note 24, at 851–52 (explaining role of law in reducing
“cost of vulnerability” in instances of pure cognitive trust).
209.
See Hill & O’Hara, supra note 22, at 1752–54 (discussing role of law in
encouraging specific trust (akin to cognitive/calculating trust) where trust biases, such as ingroup bias, might cause non-optimal or misguided trust).
210.
Trust literature considers the role of law and trust in various fiduciary
relationships and provides insightful guidance to the LLC analysis. See, e.g., Blair & Stout,
supra note 26, at 1781–90 (discussing trust in corporate fiduciary context but noting that
analysis for unincorporated entities—such as LLCs—might be different); Hill & O’Hara,
supra note 22, at 1762–95 (discussing trust theory in context of doctor-patient and corporate
directors).
211.
See, e.g., Chrisman, supra note 31, at 459–62 (“The limited liability
company (LLC) is now undeniably the most popular form of new business entity in the
United States. . . . The only areas that have not been dominated by the LLC are those of
publicly traded companies, companies that plan to become publicly traded companies, and
non-profit entities.”).
212.
See supra Part I.A.1.
213.
The application of trust theory to governance structures admittedly is
complex and nuanced. See, e.g., Andrew S. Gold, The New Concept of Loyalty in Corporate
Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 457, 513 (2009) (discussing complexities inherent in analyzing
corporate governance principles under trust theory). Nevertheless, the principles underlying
trust theory can help inform the parameters of governance regulations. See id. (using trust
theory to evaluate and propose methods to enhance corporate directors’ duty of loyalty).
214.
These relationships generally fit the “paradigmatic” trust relationship that
develops gradually and warrants less regulatory intervention. See supra Part III.A.2.
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relationship, even if it is in the early stages. 215 Moreover, parties typically perform
due diligence and insist on information necessary to accurately assess the risk
profile of the transaction. Although these characteristics will not hold for every
joint-venture type LLC, they are likely present in many.
In this type of business venture, the trust relationship may provide even
stronger incentives than are provided by regulations for parties to act in the LLC’s
best interests—or at least not to the detriment of the LLC and its other members.
These incentives flow from the parties’ relationship, shared values, common
acquaintances, and the terms of the contract itself. For example, in several of the
database Operating Agreements, the language suggests that the parties had a
general sense (affective trust) that the other members would pursue joint interests
but also recognized the unique position of many parties with ventures outside of
the LLC.216 In these cases, the parties crafted detailed provisions to ease
restrictions on self-dealing and conflicts of interest, likely based on an assessment
of parties’ needs and each member’s own desire to protect against downside
risk.217 Parties engaging in this type of considered, informed trust (even if an
imperfect risk assessment) are reaching a deal that establishes the parties’ desired
risk allocation, prices that allocation into deal terms, and likely approaches an
optimal result and level of trust. Legal regulation—unlike informed trust—cannot
be tailored to the parties’ particular transaction and, accordingly, must be carefully
tailored not to dampen the effects of informed trust.
Notably, an LLC having only a few members does not necessarily lead to
an informed trust relationship. The parties may not know each other (either
directly or indirectly through business or industry sources) or they may know each
other very well, being family members or long-time friends.218 As discussed
above, these situations are more susceptible to trust biases and misguided trust.
The circumstances that lead to over- or under-trusting also may arise in LLCs with
a significant number of members. For example, in LLCs formed as investment
vehicles members may be passive investors who lack the information and the
relationships necessary to make an accurate trust assessment.219 Moreover, the
structure of the LLC membership and the underlying trust relationships may vary
not only among LLCs but also within LLC membership classes.220 Accordingly,
some types of LLCs may require legal regulation in lieu of any trust relationship.

215.
See Colombo, supra note 24, at 870 (arguing that the minimal regulation of
hedge funds comports with trust theory given that “the hedge fund industry is marked by
repeat players, generally drawn from a similar social milieu”).
216.
See supra Part II.C.1.
217.
See supra Part II.C.1.
218.
See Hill & O’Hara, supra note 22, at 1750 (discussing role of emotion in
various relationships that may “amplif[y] the potential for systematic overtrust and
undertrust”).
219.
See supra Part III.A.2.
220.
See supra Part III.A.2.
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The diversity in LLC forms complicates the trust theory analysis. Unlike
corporate management structures,221 doctor-patient settings,222 or specific
investment firms,223 it is difficult to generalize about the relationships underlying
LLCs. Nevertheless, trust theory still informs the analysis. The remainder of the
Article uses trust theory, prior LLC literature, and the OA Study to develop
specific policy recommendations.
C. Tailoring LLC Laws to Maximize Trust and Utility
Developing a brightline legal standard is difficult, but certainty adds
significant value in the business context.224 Parties doing business together need to
understand ex ante the parameters in which they can work without incurring
additional transactional or litigation costs ex post. Any such costs can dramatically
change the value of the deal and saddle parties with results for which they never
bargained. Parties forming LLCs under existing statutory and decisional law face
this type of uncertainty, often despite their best efforts to comply with the law. 225
The task of adding certainty to the laws governing LLCs, however,
requires a delicate balancing of multiple competing interests and policy concerns.
The simple fixes of mandating a minimal level of fiduciary duty and management
standards of conduct, or alternatively allowing all terms to be fixed solely by the
parties’ contract, would be easy to design yet likely unsatisfactory in
implementation and result.226 Not all LLC relationships are suited for governance
primarily by contract.227 In those that are, parties likely would incur significant
costs trying to find work-arounds or forego valuable opportunities if required to
operate under mandatory regulations that worked against their best interests.
Parties also may try—either consciously or unconsciously—to offset increased
costs by relaxing their trust assessment of their counterparties.
LLC governance standards require a more nuanced, but definitive,
approach that (i) maintains a strong set of default rules for parties not wanting or
needing to incur the expense of bargaining a deal-specific contract, (ii) protects
221.
See, e.g., Blair & Stout, supra note 26, at 1781–90.
222.
See, e.g., Hill & O’Hara, supra note 22, at 1762–79.
223.
See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 24, at 857–74.
224.
See, e.g., Jack B. Jacobs, The Uneasy Truce Between Law and Equity in
Modern Business Enterprise Jurisprudence, 8 DEL. L. REV. 1, 15 (2005) (“Equity will
always be with us, but why not develop a bright line rule that would make the application of
equity more predictable?”).
225.
See Seita, supra note 20, at 101 (“Although case decisions may seek to
encourage efficient behavior, the uncertainties of litigation together with differing risk
attitudes of the contract parties may encourage inefficient breaches . . . .”); see also supra
Part I.B.1.
226.
For deficiencies in a contract model, see supra note 90 and accompanying
text. For deficiencies in a model of a mandatory minimum level of duties and conduct, see
Professor Miller’s work, which argues for mandatory fiduciary duties while noting the
limitations as expressed by Professor Ribstein. MILLER, supra note 30 § 4:14.
227.
See generally Larry E. Ribstein, The Uncorporation’s Domain, 55 VILL. L.
REV. 125 (2010) (discussing utility of uncorporate forms).
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investors lacking the information or trust relationship to meaningfully assess and
allocate risk in the governance context, and (iii) allows parties actively involved in
the negotiation of the contract to set their own governance terms. The coactive
LLC concept implements this approach.
1. The Coactive LLC
The coactive LLC approach emerges from the OA Study, prior LLC
literature, and trust theory. The OA Study shows that some parties can and do
negotiate thoughtfully about the terms of their relationship—from the economics
to governance to the consequences of misconduct—creating a coactive LLC.228
Although these agreements cannot cover every potential contingency, traditional
contract law is well-suited to enforce these bargains. 229 Nevertheless, the OA
Study also suggests trends of unequal bargaining power that allow those with
management rights to obtain lax standards of conduct and significant liability
protection.230 These trends may be less troublesome if considered by the parties
and priced into the overall deal terms, but Miller’s empirical surveys suggest that
some LLC relationships lack this type of thoughtful negotiation. Miller’s surveys
also raise questions about the knowledge of and information available to parties
forming some LLCs.231
Trust theory complements the OA Study and prior literature by explaining
when parties are more likely to assess the trustworthiness of counterparties and
therefore more accurately allocate and price risk. 232 Performing the type of factspecific analysis required under trust theory on a case-by-case basis, however,
does not produce a cohesive and generally applicable legal standard. Something
more is needed—a standard based on objective criteria informed by trust theory.
This Article proposes a standard based on the existing default rules
structure of LLC statutes with the clarification that some level of traditional
fiduciary duties are mandated for managing members and managers in all LLCs
other than coactive LLCs.233 Coactive LLCs are identified by three key elements:
(i) fully informed parties, (ii) active negotiation by the parties at the time the
particular member signs the Operating Agreement, and (iii) some control or

228.
See generally supra Part II.
229.
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in
Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1395, 1410 (1989) (explaining that an efficient legal
standard is hypothetical contracting where “[r]ational and fully informed parties would
agree ex ante on the value-maximizing arrangement”).
230.
See supra Part II.B.2.
231.
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
232.
See supra Part III.A.2.
233.
The level of duties owed by managing members and managers in noncoactive LLCs should provide accountability to owners akin to that owed among partners
under most state’s partnership statutes. See UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 103(b)(3), (4) (amended
1997), 6 U.L.A. 73 (2001) (specifying that the partnership agreement may not “eliminate
the duty of loyalty [except if not manifestly unreasonable or if ratified by all or a percentage
of partners specified in the agreement or] unreasonably reduce the duty of care”).
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meaningful role in material transactions pursued by the LLC. Parties could opt into
the coactive LLC form by certifying qualification based on these elements.234
2. Fully Informed Parties
Parties to coactive LLCs must have access to all information reasonably
necessary for the parties to assess the proposed LLC and, in turn, the
trustworthiness of the other members. Although many potential business partners
perform significant due diligence before doing business together, many do not.
This requirement would encourage more thoughtful diligence by parties wanting
complete freedom of contract.235 Admittedly, there is a cost associated with this
diligence that parties could avoid by following default rules. As such, parties must
consider this cost in forming coactive LLCs and factor it into the value of the
overall transaction.
3. Active Negotiation
The active negotiation requirement ensures that parties to coactive LLCs
have a seat at the bargaining table. This seat does not ensure equal bargaining
power, but it gives parties an opportunity to discuss and understand the deal
terms.236 A party at the bargaining table can decide whether the ultimate deal
satisfies its needs and risk appetite. If it does not, the party can walk away. 237 If it
elects to sign the Operating Agreement, the party should not be able to upset the
expectations of other parties at the bargaining table after the fact, absent fraud or
misrepresentation.
Situations with the earmarks of informed, active bargaining are in stark
contrast to a party being presented a form or a completed Operating Agreement
with only the option to sign or not sign. 238 A “take it or leave it” approach to
234.
Parties forming coactive LLCs would certify in the LLC’s articles of
organization that the members satisfied the three key elements and that the LLC qualified as
a coactive LLC. Contract law—for example, fraud in the inducement or
misrepresentation—is well suited to address any challenges to this representation by
members ex post.
235.
Although some have suggested increasing diligence by parties through
increased regulation, the coactive LLC approach proposes incentivizing parties to collect
and assess relevant information by allowing those parties who do it (and meet the other
requirements of coactive LLCs) to opt out of otherwise mandatory regulations. See Hill &
O’Hara, supra note 22, at 1756–57.
236.
For a general discussion of contractual bargaining power, see Daniel D.
Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (2005).
237.
Id. at 180 (“[E]very party theoretically has the power to walk away from the
proposed bargain and satisfy its needs or wants elsewhere.”); see also Herman B. Leonard
& Richard J. Zeckhauser, Financial Risk and the Burdens of Contracts, 75 AM. ECON. REV.
375, 375, 379 (1985) (“Risk perceptions, risk preferences, and the chosen allocation of risk
between the parties are three elements of the collection [of information and incentive
burdens, but] full optimality [of contracts] is difficult to achieve.” (citations omitted)).
238.
For a general discussion of the limitations of form documents, see Kirsten K.
Davis, Legal Forms as Rhetorical Transaction: Competency in the Context of Information
and Efficiency, 79 UMKC L. REV. 667 (2011).
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Operating Agreements should not garner the freedom of contract privilege. In
those situations, the efficiency of the process and the potential for undue influence
also come at a price: governance by mandatory fiduciary duties.
4. Retained Control
Finally, the last element of the coactive LLC—the requirement that
members have control or a meaningful role in material transactions—eliminates
passive investments in this type of LLC. Although parties may still allocate and
price risk in these situations, those allocations have a high probability of being
inaccurate given the significant opportunity for abuse by managers with complete
discretion.239 These situations are akin to those described as “overtrusting” under
trust theory and closely resemble traditional fiduciary relationships.240 Indeed, the
passive member is entrusting things of value to the complete discretion of the
managing member or manager.241 Accordingly, lack of control or meaningful
influence warrants the protection of traditional fiduciary duties.
Notably, this last element does not mean that manager-managed LLCs are
excluded from qualifying as coactive LLCs. As demonstrated by the OA Study,
many manager-managed LLCs reserve significant voting rights to the members,
including major business decisions; admission of new members; economic
contributions and distributions; and dissolution, liquidation, or bankruptcy of the
LLC.242 If members ultimately retain control over these or similar matters—
whether in a member-managed or manager-managed LLC—they also should retain
the discretion to contract for governance terms.
The concept of control or influence over a business entity is not new, and
decisional law exists to guide the determination. In the coactive LLC context, the
four-prong test endorsed by the U.S. Supreme Court in SEC v. Howey is
particularly apt.243 This test considers whether an “investment contract” is a
“security” for purposes of the 1933 Securities Act. The test commonly is
articulated as: (i) a monetary investment (ii) with an expectation of profits from
(iii) a common enterprise that (iv) depends solely or substantially on the efforts of
third parties.244 If an investment meets the test, the investment contract—which
239.
Larry T. Garvin, Small Business and the False Dichotomies of Contract Law,
40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 295, 308–09 (2005) (explaining—based upon the psychological
idea of “bounded rationality”—that if information is scarce, decisions are based on
cognitive shortcuts which “increas[e] the likelihood and magnitude of error”).
240.
See Hill & O’Hara, supra note 22, at 1723 (describing “overtrust” between
board members and corporate officers and patients and doctors whereby “trust-relevant
information” is not accurately processed).
241.
See supra Part I.A.2.
242.
See supra Part II.C.1.b.
243.
328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946).
244.
Id. at 298–301. With respect to the last element of the Howey test, this
Article adopts the slightly relaxed iteration suggested by the Supreme Court and used by
various lower courts. See United Hous. Found. v. Foreman, 421 U.S. 837, 839, 852 (1975)
(focusing on whether profits were “derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
others”).
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may be an LLC ownership or economic interest—is a security and federal
securities laws apply accordingly.245
The Howey test is extremely useful in analyzing the last element of
coactive LLCs. The fact that a member investing in an LLC relies solely or
substantially on the managers or other members to manage and grow that
investment indicates a lack of meaningful control by the member itself. That
investing member has little ability to affect the course of the LLC or protect his
monetary investment; that member closely resembles the shareholder beneficiary
of traditional fiduciary duties in the business context. Moreover, if a member’s
LLC interest is a security, traditional fiduciary duties complement the disclosure
and investor protection objectives of federal securities laws. 246
5. Implementation of the Coactive LLC
In sum, LLC statutes and decisional law applying them should impose
traditional fiduciary duties unless the LLC qualifies as a coactive LLC. Although
this approach strikes an appropriate balance in the fiduciary debate, it likely will
not appease some commentators on either side of the debate. For example, those
who support mandatory fiduciary duties will likely argue that minority members in
coactive LLCs are still subject to oppression by managers or the majority. 247 This
position, however, fails to recognize and respect the intentional business decision
made by parties to coactive LLCs. The law should not substitute its concept of a
good or fair business deal for that negotiated by the parties, absent flaws or
weaknesses in the bargaining process.248
Likewise, those who support no fiduciary duties or the ability to modify
or eliminate fiduciary duties in all LLCs will likely argue that parties should be
able to contract for the terms of their business relationship, regardless of the
process or knowledge of the parties.249 Admittedly, even passive investors or illinformed investors can choose to forego the LLC opportunity and invest their
money elsewhere. Nevertheless, the limited ability of these investors to accurately
assess the trustworthiness of the counterparties and the efficiency of default rules
in these situations support a compromise that preserves complete freedom of
contract for some, but not all, types of LLCs.

245.
Howey, 328 U.S. at 299; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(10) (2012)
(defining “security” for purposes of federal securities laws).
246.
For a discussion of publicly-traded LLCs, see Ribstein, supra note 227.
247.
See supra Part I.B.2.
248.
See, e.g., Barnhizer, supra note 236, at 141 (“[C]ourts must identify those
situations in which bargaining power should have legal consequences and develop more
sophisticated and realistic analyses of that phenomenon.”); Steele, supra note 89, at 238
(“[A] court may strike terms to an agreement if it finds some indicia of fraud, undue
influence, or adhesion [but s]imply because, on occasion, parties may ineffectively bargain,
ex ante, does not require the courts to swoop in as a protector for ill-advised contract
makers.”).
249.
See supra note 89 and accompanying text.
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The coactive LLC concept provides a framework for legislatures and
courts to implement freedom of contract principles while protecting truly
vulnerable parties. This balance should ease courts’ concerns regarding fairness
and promote legislatures’ intent to grant flexibility in business formation
decisions.250 A solution that addresses the perspectives of both courts and
legislatures has a greater chance of being enforced consistently, thereby creating
certainty for the business community. A solution that provides complete freedom
of contract for parties satisfying objective criteria also permits parties to elect the
LLC form that best serves their business and economic goals. The coactive LLC is
a well-balanced compromise that promotes the underlying purpose of the LLC
form in a fair and consistent manner.

CONCLUSION
The LLC form allows parties to craft an entity that facilitates their
business objectives and reflects their desired governance structure. The freedom of
contract principle underlying the LLC form, however, raises concerns among
policymakers and commentators.251 The potential for information asymmetry and
unequal bargaining power exists and may expose parties—particularly minority or
passive investors—to increased risk of loss. Policymakers and commentators also
have raised questions regarding the need for and utility of the LLC form.
The OA Study presents an in-depth empirical study of actual Operating
Agreements. The study dissects the substance of these agreements and uses the
data to draw meaningful inferences regarding parties’ governance and other
preferences in the LLC form. The data suggest that many parties intensely
negotiate Operating Agreements, and the overwhelming majority of agreements
modify traditional fiduciary duties in some respect.252 These modifications are not
necessarily blanket waivers, but they often reflect particular parameters likely
reached through negotiation. Nevertheless, regression analysis also suggests that
some parties—in particular, managing members and managers—may possess
greater influence at the bargaining table, allowing these parties to achieve
substantial discretion and liability protection.253 Accordingly, even in a population
of Operating Agreements among arguably sophisticated parties in developed
industries, the potential for information asymmetry and unequal bargaining power
may exist. It also may be an appropriate allocation of risk based on the parties’
pricing of the contract and their respective appetites for risk.
The challenge then is to determine when parties in the LLC context are
truly vulnerable versus when they knowingly negotiated what in hindsight is a bad
business deal. The OA Study, interpreted in light of the prior LLC literature and
trust theory, suggests returning to the assumptions underlying the LLC form (for
example that LLCs are organized by represented, sophisticated, and fully informed
parties) in striking an appropriate balance in LLC fiduciary policy. These
250.
251.
252.
253.

See supra Part I.
See supra Part I.
See supra Part II.C.
See supra Part II.C.2.
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assumptions generally align with the required elements of informed trust, which
considers when parties have the capacity to accurately assess the trustworthiness of
the counterparty and likely risk exposure. 254 Any standard governing deference to
the parties’ contractual governance structure should seek to optimize informed
trust and establish limitations in circumstances potentially leading to misguided
trust or trust abuses.
An approach that retains default rules for governing LLCs and imposes
mandatory fiduciary duties in all LLCs other than coactive LLCs strikes an
appropriate policy balance. This approach continues the freedom of contract
principle for parties who intentionally choose the terms of the Operating
Agreement through active negotiation, informed decision-making, and some
control over the direction of the LLC—i.e., parties to coactive LLCs. Parties who
do not satisfy these criteria really are not doing business by contract, and the law
should not pretend that they are. Imposing fiduciary duties on managers or
managing members in LLCs other than coactive LLCs encourages parties to
engage in meaningful negotiations about their business relationship or comply with
the traditional standards of conduct in the business community. In either scenario,
it provides appropriate incentives for parties to do the right thing and an
appropriate role for regulation in the parties’ business relationship.

254.

See supra Part III.A.1.

